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ABSTRACT 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinions in Weinberger and Technicolor have left a 
troublesome uncertainty in defining the proper approach to the valuation of corporate 
shares. That uncertainty–increasingly important as going private mergers become more 
frequent—can be resolved by a blend of financial and doctrinal analysis. The primary 
problem, the potential opportunism by controlling shareholders in timing going private 
mergers, can be addressed by a more complete understanding of corporate finance. The 
definition of fair value must include not only the present value of the firm’s existing 
assets, but also the future opportunities to reinvest free cash flow, including reinvestment 
opportunities identified, even if not yet developed, before the merger. This issue has been 
incompletely articulated by the courts. On the other hand, value created by the merger 
that can only be achieved by means of the merger itself—such as reduced costs of public 
company compliance—should not be included in determining fair value. We also show 
that except in the case of acquisitions by third parties (where actual sale value, minus 
synergies, is a useful measure of fair value), hypothetical third-party sale value does not 
and should not ordinarily be taken as a measure of fair value. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Weinberger1 decision in 1983 revolutionized appraisal law, and like many 
revolutions left an array of messy puzzles that persist to this day. One was its dictum 
concerning the statutory prohibition against including gains from mergers in calculating 
the fair value of the firm in appraisal.2 Despite the literal clarity and breadth of the 
statutory prohibition, the court opined that the exclusion is “a very narrow exception to 
the appraisal process, designed to eliminate use of . . . projections of a speculative variety 
relating to the completion of the merger.”3 It was not until Technicolor4 that both the 
Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the Weinberger 
ruling and its tension with the literal language of the statutory exclusion. While the court 
of chancery attempted to resolve that tension,5 the supreme court rejected the 
Chancellor’s reasoning and reaffirmed its earlier ruling, without providing much 
guidance for resolving the uncertainty as to the scope of the statutory valuation 
exclusion.6
The issue is a significant one. Appraisal is becoming an increasingly important 
remedy7 in light of the growth of going private mergers,8 the fact that appraisal is the 
exclusive remedy in short-form mergers after Glassman,9 and the growing use of tender 
offers as the mechanism of choice for completing a merger.10 In all these cases, it is the 
squeeze-out cash merger (along with the mergers involving a close corporation) that 
gives rise to most of the appraisal cases. What then to make of the supreme court’s ruling 
in Weinberger? What types of gains that occur after such a merger can be included in 
valuing a firm in appraisal? Is the line drawn between “speculative” and “nonspeculative” 
gains, as the court suggested,11 or should the line be drawn differently? 
The issue has not received much concentrated attention from academic researchers. 
Perhaps the main exception, for our purposes, is Professor Coffee’s 1996 article.12 In that 
article he stated that in squeeze-out mergers, gains resulting from the controller’s use of 
 1. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 2. Id. at 713 (interpreting the Delaware appraisal statute); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2001). 
 3. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. 
 4. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). 
 5. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990), rev’d, 684 
A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). 
 6. Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 297; see infra Part IV.A.1. 
 7. Our rough count of appraisal opinions from the Delaware courts in the 22 years since 1983, when 
Weinberger was decided, reveals a total of 46 opinions, of which 11 were issued since January 1, 2004. 
 8. See Joshua M. Koenig, A Brief Roadmap to Going Private, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 505, 506 
(2004). 
 9. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (holding that “absent fraud or 
illegality, appraisal is the exclusive remedy available to a minority stockholder who objects to a short-form 
merger”). 
 10. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 785, 825 (2003) (noting the “doctrinal anomalies posed by the freeze-out, tender offer strategy”); Guhan 
Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory, Evidence and Policy (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion 
Paper No. 472, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=530284 (noting significant increase in use of tender 
offer/short-form merger freeze-out technique). 
 11. Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 296-300. 
 12. John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage 
Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359 (1996). 
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inside information should be included in calculating the fair value of the firm, while other 
merger gains should not.13 In concluding, Coffee said that the courts should be attentive 
to the “hidden cash flows” that result from inside information.14 Although Coffee’s 
analytical structure has been of some help to the courts,15 the fact that the 
recommendation turns on hidden cash flows renders it less useful in its actual application. 
In addition, there is a small literature that touches on a broader issue: whether the 
appropriate standard in appraisal should be going concern value (the standard applied by 
the court) or one of two alternatives, third-party sale value or market value. 
Commentators have weighed in on all sides of this debate.16
In this Article we provide a rationale for the courts’ use of going concern value. We 
also propose a resolution of the dilemma the court faces in deciding which gains that 
follow a merger should be included in the fair value of the firm and which gains should 
not. Our rule is broader than the one proposed by Coffee and, we believe, is easier to use. 
In several instances, in fact, we believe that our approach simply echoes settled judicial 
articulations of valuation standards. In other cases, however, we believe that the case law, 
while not inconsistent with our approach, has not fully developed appropriate doctrinal 
guidance. 
In Part III we briefly review the relevant rules governing appraisal, drawing 
particular attention to the difficulties posed by the Delaware Supreme Court’s dictum in 
Weinberger. We then provide a theoretical justification for the use of going concern value 
as the appropriate standard for valuation. In doing so we develop a three-part 
categorization that spans most of the appraisal case law. 
The first category involves mergers where the squeeze-out is a result of the purchase 
of the firm by a third party. In resolving cases in this category, the courts have discussed 
and used, in different ways, the third-party sale price as the critical piece of information 
in valuing the firm. For this category we propose a rule that justifies the use of third-party 
sale value as a critical input in some cases but not in others. The second category 
involves a squeeze-out merger where the controller squeezes out the minority but 
otherwise conducts the business of the corporation in a largely unchanged way. We 
believe that most appraisal cases fall into this category, and it is this category of cases 
that best illustrates why going concern value needs to be the standard of appraisal 
valuation. The third category of cases is the most difficult and is where the dictum in 
 13. Id. at 416 (“[T]he most sensible line is to deem synergistic gains as a necessary element of fair value 
only in the case of insider buyouts and squeeze-outs and only when the buyer had access to the target 
corporation’s confidential business plans and projections in framing its proposal.”) (emphasis added). 
 14. Id. at 420-21. 
 15. See ONTI Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 911 (Del. Ch. 1999) (rejecting Coffee’s conclusion). 
 16. E.g., Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and 
Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072 (1983) (urging a rule of proportionate sharing of merger gains among 
both controlling and non-controlling shareholders); John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of 
Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1351 (1999) 
(recommending use of acquisition “reference” values with burden on transaction proponent to validate 
exclusion of impermissible synergistic elements); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy 
and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 674-75 (1998) (advocating third-party sale value 
standard); Bruce L. Silverstein, Judicial Valuation of Stock of a Delaware Corporation: The Legal Concept of 
“Fair Value” (Apr. 20, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (suggesting adoption of a third-
party sale value standard). 
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Weinberger is most relevant. Here we propose an alternative standard that follows 
directly from applying finance theory to the problem. 
In Part IV, we review the case law applicable to our three-part categorization. By 
analyzing the interaction of finance theory and the large body of case law, we believe that 
our approach provides an understanding of the key valuation parameters that are 
important in applying the otherwise confusing dictum in Weinberger. 
This Article has both positive and normative aspects. We view the paper as 
primarily positive in that we attempt to provide both a rationale and a coherent structure 
to existing Delaware case law. We make no claims that the current law is the best 
appraisal law possible, only that some of the current inconsistencies can be reconciled in 
a manner that is consistent with the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) and the 
main court cases. At the same time, the paper is hardly devoid of normative judgments. 
On the one hand, we do not view as normative the assertion that the DGCL’s appraisal 
remedy can be understood as requiring a Pareto-superior solution. Quite to the contrary, 
the law is quite explicit on this point. On the other hand, the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
utterances, as far back as Tri-Continental and more recently in Weinberger and 
Technicolor, have to be normatively interpreted because the opinions give rise to 
conflicting interpretations. For example, some would read Technicolor as allowing or 
even encouraging an appraisal rule that would be indistinguishable from a third-party sale 
rule. We explain our contrary view by turning first to the legal setting in which the issue 
arises. 
II. LEGAL SETTING 
The legal prescription in Delaware for determining share value derives from the 
appraisal rights statute, section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.17 
Subsection (h) of that statute sets forth the relevant parameters for determining value in 
appraisal proceedings: 
[The court of chancery] shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value 
exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with a fair rate of interest, 
if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value. In 
determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant 
factors.18
Section 262 provides four important instructions, which we first summarize and then 
explore in greater detail. The first instruction is that any shareholders who have not voted 
in favor of the merger and have otherwise complied with the statute’s procedural 
requirements are entitled to an award of the “fair value” for their shares.19 The statute, 
however, does not provide any further explicit definition of “fair value.” The second 
instruction is that “fair value,” whatever it does mean, does not include any “element of 
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation.”20 
 17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2005). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. § 262(a). 
 20. Id. 
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The exact meaning of this exclusion—and specifically whether it should be read broadly 
or narrowly—became a major unresolved issue in appraisal cases after the Delaware 
Supreme Court spoke directly to the issue in Weinberger,21 but in a manner that opened 
the interpretation problem rather than closing it. The third point of instruction is that the 
appraisal remedy is entirely about determining and awarding “fair value,” and evidence 
with respect to a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is largely irrelevant to that task.22 
Finally, the appraisal remedy is available in only limited types of cases. The statutory 
choice of contexts in which appraisal rights are conferred determines the special 
problems that emerge in determining the meaning of “fair value.” 
A. Fair Value 
“Fair value” is a legal term. How is it to be interpreted? The legal explanation of fair 
value’s core meaning dates back more than half a century to Tri-Continental Corp. v. 
Battye, a 1950 case in which the Delaware Supreme Court stated: “The basic concept of 
value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholders are entitled to be paid for that 
which has been taken from them, viz. his proportionate interest in a going concern.”23 
Other cases have characterized this concept in a shorthand way as “going concern 
value,”24 while still other cases describe the concept as the “true” or “intrinsic” value of 
the stock that has been taken by the merger.25 Although these concepts are not 
completely unhelpful in selecting appropriate finance methods for measuring fair value, 
there is considerable room for ambiguity. For example, what is the “intrinsic” value of 
the stock, a term that has no precise counterpart in finance theory? 
For decades prior to 1983, courts measured the intrinsic value of stock using the 
Delaware block method.26 In that method, the court determined, where possible, the 
value of the company’s assets, the market price of its stock, and the value of its earnings. 
These components were each assigned a particular weight that varied with the 
circumstances of the case.27 The sum of the weighted components was the intrinsic value 
or fair value of the stock. Since the capital asset pricing model was not developed until 
 21. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
 22. See infra Part II.C. 
 23. Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950). 
 24. See infra note 54. 
 25. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455-56 (Del. Ch. 1934); see also Roessler v. Sec. Sav. & Loan 
Co., 72 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ohio 1947). 
 26. See, e.g., Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 69 (Del. 1968); see also Walter S. Cheesman 
Realty Co. v. Moore, 770 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Richardson v. Palmer Broadcasting, 353 
N.W.2d 374, 378 (Iowa 1984); In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 60 
(Me. 1979); Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173, 178-79 (Mass. 1985); Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 765 
P.2d 207 (Or. 1988); Blasingame v. Am. Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Tenn. 1983); General Valuation 
Standards, 2-36 DEL. CORP. LAW & PRACTICE § 36.07 (MB) (2005) (stating that the courts’ insistence on the 
use of the block method “arose out of [their] desire for an analytical framework in which the valuation 
judgments of court-appointed appraisers could be identified and reviewed by the courts”) (citing Jacques Coe & 
Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 75 A.2d 244, 246 (Del. Ch. 1950)). 
 27. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (“This means that the so-called ‘Delaware 
block’ or weighted average method was employed wherein the elements of value, i.e., assets, market price, 
earnings, etc., were assigned a particular weight and the resulting amounts added to determine the value per 
share. This procedure has been in use for decades.”). See also In re Gen. Realty & Util. Corp., 52 A.2d 6, 14-15 
(Del. Ch. 1947).
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the 1960s,28 the court’s ad hoc approach was not strictly dominated by anything finance 
theory had to offer until then. 
In Weinberger, however, the Delaware Supreme Court abandoned insistence upon 
the block method, and instead stated that the methodology to be used for measuring fair 
value should be generally accepted techniques used in the financial community.29 As the 
supreme court’s direction has been applied over the years since Weinberger, the court of 
chancery has increasingly come to favor “discounted cash flow” (DCF) analysis of 
modern finance theory as the core approach to measuring value.30 In this theory, the 
value of an asset is the present value of the discounted stream of future free cash flows 
that the asset can generate.31 The discount rate used in this method is one of several 
mean/variance theories of discount rates, the most well-known being the capital asset 
pricing model.32 We take the timing of the Weinberger decision as well as subsequent 
Delaware case law to mean that the technique to be applied whenever possible is indeed 
the technique that generations of MBAs have been taught as the core approach to valuing 
assets. 
The finance theory, however, is highly stylized and dependent on a host of 
assumptions that are rarely met, and the theory is in fact weakest in those areas where 
appraisal is available.33 The result is competing definitions of fair value.34 For example, 
 28. The original published papers on the capital asset pricing model are William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset 
Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964), and John Lintner, The 
Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgeting, 47 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965). 
 29. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712. (“[T]o the extent [the Delaware block method] excludes other generally 
accepted techniques used in the financial community and the courts, it is now clearly outmoded. It is time we 
recognize this in appraisal and other stock valuation proceedings and bring our law current on the subject.”).
 30. See, e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12334, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1997) (observing that the DCF approach is “increasingly the model of choice for valuations 
in this Court”); Ryan v. Tad’s Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 702 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The discounted cash flow 
valuation model is well-established and accepted in the financial community.”), aff’d, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 
1997). 
 31. The ONTI court stated: 
The DCF model entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will 
generate and when, over some period; a terminal value equal to the future value, as of the end of 
the projection period, of the firm’s cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of 
capital with which to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the 
estimated terminal or residual value. 
ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 917 (Del. Ch. 1999) (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. 
A. No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *24 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990)). The terminal value can be estimated 
in a number of different ways. The court typically assigns the term DCF analysis to one particular estimate of 
the terminal value; namely the Gordon growth model where the terminal value is estimated by discounting to 
the present value the last period free cash flow divided by the difference between the market capitalization or 
discount rate minus the assumed future growth rate in free cash flow. However, the DCF analysis, as the term is 
used in modern finance, also includes methods where the terminal value is estimated by capitalizing the last 
period earnings or book value by using either a stock market based price-earnings multiple or a multiple of book 
value. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 509-11 (8th ed. 2005). 
 32. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 190. 
 33. The capital asset pricing model applies only to publicly traded companies and thus does not offer a 
theory for close corporations. In addition, the theory assumes stock trades in liquid capital markets, which rules 
out closely held but publicly traded stock. The courts’ use of DCF analysis in evaluating close corporation 
shares thus depends on the use of alternative methods for estimating the corporation’s cost of equity capital (for 
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can market prices be used as the best available measure of firm value? After all, finance 
theory has not only canonized DCF, but the efficient capital market hypothesis as well.35 
Alternatively, could third-party sale value be used in valuing the company? After all, the 
definition of value used by economists is a version of third-party sale value—that is, the 
opportunity cost of the asset in its next best use.36
One obvious problem with using third-party sale value, at least without 
modification, is that it includes elements of value created by the merger that would not 
otherwise exist. This inclusion conflicts with the statutory mandate that “any element of 
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation” 
must be excluded.37 And, in fact, case law has held consistently that third-party sale 
value, to the extent that it includes synergies created by the merger, cannot be used as a 
measure of fair value.38
B. The Exclusion of Value Arising from the Merger and the Language of Weinberger 
Although the statute states that value arising from the expectation or 
accomplishment of the merger cannot be included in appraisal, the meaning of that 
language was thrown into some confusion by the supreme court’s decision in 
Weinberger. The court specifically held that in determining fair value based on all 
relevant factors: 
[o]nly the speculative elements of value that may arise from the 
“accomplishment or expectation” of the merger are excluded. We take this to 
be a very narrow exception to the appraisal process, designed to eliminate use 
of pro forma data and projections of a speculative variety relating to the 
completion of a merger. But elements of future value, including the nature of 
the enterprise, which are known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the 
merger and not the product of speculation, may be considered.39
This language set off a debate that remains unresolved to this day, particularly since, 
if read broadly, it may conflict with the statutory mandate excluding values arising from 
the completion of a merger. What is to be made of the last sentence, which presumably 
provides the guidance as to what elements of value can be included? Standing alone, the 
sentence makes good sense and provides excellent guidance. In the context of the 
paragraph, however, it is puzzling. 
Clearly, this critical last sentence in Weinberger is referring to the future value of 
example, by reference to observations of trading in shares of comparable companies, the shares of which trade 
in liquid markets). 
 34. The “internal rate of return” (IRR) method used in finance is not one of the competitors. The method is 
often used in finance to determine whether to proceed with a particular investment or asset purchase. However, 
it is structured to answer the question of whether the rate of return from the investment or purchase is greater 
than the investor’s hurdle or discount rate. Hence, the IRR method does not provide an estimate of the value of 
an investment or asset. 
 35. Efficient markets and the capital asset pricing model are taught in all major finance textbooks. See 
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31; STEVEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE (7th ed. 2005). 
 36. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 16. 
 37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2005). 
 38. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 39. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
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the enterprise that is the target of the merger. More specifically, it is not referring to the 
new corporation or combination that will result from the merger. Rather, the language of 
Weinberger seems to establish the nature of the enterprise at the time of the merger as the 
key parameter in the valuation exercise. Defining “the nature of the enterprise,” however, 
is not a mechanistic task. Although we address this issue in more detail below, a few 
introductory comments are useful. 
It is well accepted that the value of a corporation and its assets depends on the future 
free cash flows that are generated.40 Fair value is thus forward-looking. Most obviously, 
the concept of fair value takes account of the current assets of the corporation and the free 
cash flow generated by those assets. Perhaps less obviously, fair value must also take 
account of the corporation’s reinvestment opportunities as well. Most corporations are 
not closed end, wasting asset enterprises, and estimates of future free cash flows almost 
invariably involve projected returns on reinvestment of future free cash flows. The 
“nature of the enterprise” is therefore not defined solely by its current asset stock, but by 
the current assets and those assets it is likely to acquire as part of its current corporate 
policy. 
The problem that arises in some of the most difficult appraisal cases is that 
reinvestment opportunities that inhere in the corporation are taken by the controlling 
shareholder as a result of a merger cashing out the minority shareholders. From a legal 
standpoint, the controller’s actions may or may not constitute a breach of the duty of 
loyalty in the form of a taking of a corporate opportunity. From a finance perspective, 
however, when such opportunities are known at the date of the merger and are part of the 
corporate policy options the firm is planning to exploit, they should be included as part of 
the value of the firm. This brings us to the third issue, the intersection of appraisal and 
breach of the duty of loyalty. 
C. Appraisal Remedy as a Claim Distinct from Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
The appraisal hearing is by its very nature distinct from a hearing over allegations of 
a breach of fiduciary duty. Where the statute confers the right to an appraisal following a 
merger, that right exists regardless of whether the merger is the product of breach of 
fiduciary duty. Appraisal is therefore generally understood as entirely a valuation 
exercise, in which evidence of breach of fiduciary duty is irrelevant.41 It is true, of 
course, that many appraisal claims proceed concurrently—and sometimes in a 
consolidated proceeding—with allegations of breach of fiduciary duty. This is a judicially 
economical approach, where the appraisal analysis would overlap with the determination 
of fair value as part of entire fairness scrutiny.42 Yet a claim that the merger violates the 
 40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 41. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001); Ala. By-Products Corp. v. 
Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 257 (Del. 1991) (acknowledging the pertinence of unfair dealing in assessing credibility, 
but reiterating that “claims for unfair dealing cannot be litigated in a statutory appraisal proceeding”). 
 42. The practice of concurrently addressing appraisal and fiduciary duty claims was first explicitly 
endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court in the first of its several opinions in the Technicolor litigation. Cede 
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1191 (Del. 1988). Since that time, numerous cases have had 
valuation and fiduciary duty issues tried together. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
Civ. A. No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004); ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904 
(Del. Ch. 1999); In re Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 488 (Del. Ch. 1991). In other cases, appraisal 
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directors’ or controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty remains foreign to the pure 
valuation exercise contemplated by the appraisal statute. 
Nevertheless, we claim that concepts related to the fiduciary duty of loyalty—
particularly the expression of that duty in the doctrine of corporate opportunity—may 
help resolve the issue framed in the preceding section, namely the characterization of the 
nature of the enterprise being valued. The prototypical corporate opportunity case 
involves allegations that a director or executive took for her personal use and profit a 
corporate opportunity that should have been offered to the corporation.43 This often 
involves the use of corporate property, but that is not a necessary part of the complaint.44 
Typically, the taking of the opportunity has already occurred and the case is about 
whether that opportunity was one that should have been considered as belonging to the 
corporation itself. 
What “belongs” or “will belong” to the corporation, however, is also at the heart of 
the question of the nature of the enterprise being valued. The cases in which we are 
interested involve a corporate opportunity that has not yet been taken, but that will be 
taken after the minority shareholders have been squeezed out. In almost all of these cases 
the use of the corporation’s property is central to the transaction. Specifically, the assets 
of the corporation will be managed differently after the squeeze-out in a manner that is 
value creating. If such value enhancing transactions should be considered to be part of the 
nature of the enterprise being appraised, a concept of value allocation similar to the 
corporate opportunity doctrine could usefully be employed in assessing which such 
transactions should be considered to be part of the nature of the enterprise.45
D. Types of Mergers Where the Appraisal Remedy is Available 
As we explain below, the task of defining “fair value” in appraisal proceedings is 
and should be informed by understanding the situations in which the appraisal remedy is 
available. The statute confers appraisal rights in only three types of situations, cases 
involving closely held corporations, where no market value is available; cash-out 
mergers; and short-form mergers regardless of the consideration.46 In practice, this 
reduces to two situations—the case of the cash squeeze-out merger and the merger 
involving a close corporation, and most of these are squeeze-out mergers as well. 
proceedings have proceeded independently of fiduciary duty actions. See, e.g., Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P. 
v. Coleman Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 17802, 2004 WL 2059515 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004); In re Coleman Co. 
S’holders Litig., 750 A.2d 1202 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 43. See, e.g., Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 259 (Del. 2002); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 
673 A.2d 148, 154 (Del. 1996). 
 44. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939). 
If there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity which the corporation 
is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation’s business and is 
of practical advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable 
expectancy, and by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or director will be 
brought into conflict with that of the corporation, the law will not permit him to seize the 
opportunity for himself. 
Id. 
 45. See infra Part IV.D. 
 46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2004). 
[HAMERMESH & WACHTER] FINAL 5/10/2006  4:29:28 PM 
2005] The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law 129 
 
Consider first the case of the squeeze-out of minority shareholders by a controlling 
shareholder. If the company’s stock is publicly and actively traded, the evidence on 
financial market efficiency suggests that the share value will reflect the current earning 
power of the company’s assets and investors’ views as to the competency of management 
in achieving the value of the corporation. If the managers are managing the company to 
maximize the value of the corporation, the market will so perceive, and the share price 
will be a good measure of the value of the company. Suppose, however, that the market 
believes that the insider controllers are managing the assets badly or are managing in 
their own interest rather than in the interest of the other shareholders. In this case, the 
efficient financial market would correctly discount the market price below any reasonable 
measure of what the law might deem “fair” value. If the dissenting stockholders were 
cashed out at the depressed market value, the controlling shareholder would have 
succeeded in enriching itself by underpaying the minority for their shares.47
The problem is exacerbated precisely when there is a controlling shareholder 
because the company is not subject to the market for corporate control, which provides 
one of the major barriers to directors taking excessive private benefits. The result is that 
minority shares can remain indefinitely below their true or “fair” value, since claims of 
managerial breach of fiduciary duty are by no means a thoroughly effective and cost-free 
check. The amount of private benefits that are subtracted off the value of the firm by the 
market gives rise to the observation that the more faithless the controller as fiduciary, the 
less it would have to pay to the minority shareholders in appraisal. 
Appraisal is also available in a short-form merger, regardless of the consideration 
used in the squeeze-out. The case of the short-form merger generates the same problem 
as the first, but with the added burden that appraisal is the exclusive remedy, except in 
cases involving fraud or the like.48 At least in the former case, the majority shareholder 
has a fiduciary duty to pay a fair price, and a low-ball unfair merger price does not meet 
this obligation. In the case of a short-form merger, however, an entirely unfair low-ball 
price in itself gives rise to no fiduciary duty-based remedy. Moreover, if the company’s 
shares still publicly trade, the market price is even less likely to be an accurate measure 
of fundamental value than in the prior case. 
The final area where appraisal is used is where the firm being appraised is a close 
corporation. The unique problem here is that there are no market-based prices to provide 
a guide to valuation. Moreover, the valuation principles that have been adopted by the 
courts—DCF plus a version of the capital asset pricing model—work best in the case of 
public companies. The public companies have SEC filing requirements that meet a high 
standard of reporting. In addition, the capital asset pricing model was devised to estimate 
the appropriate discount rate for publicly traded companies, not private ones.49 
Consequently, even faithful fiduciaries who take little in the way of private benefits and 
who may believe in good faith that they are offering a fair price are in fact offering 
inadequate consideration. Valuation principles cannot offer more than a range of fair 
values. Hence, there has to be an appraisal-type remedy—even with the best acting 
controllers—because controllers are given discretion in setting the merger price. 
 47. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 48. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Co., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2002). 
 49. For an explanation of the capital asset pricing model, see supra note 33. 
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In light of where the appraisal remedy is available, the transactions giving rise to 
that remedy are ones approved and adopted by controlling shareholders. And for reasons 
to be discussed,50 it is significant that such controlling shareholders are frequently, if not 
predominantly, nondiversified individuals, families, or closely held enterprises.51
III. APPRAISAL THEORY, AGENCY COSTS, AND A THREE-PART                          
CATEGORIZATION OF THE CASES 
A. Appraisal Theory: Problem to be Solved and Alternative Concepts of Fair Value 
What is the problem that appraisal seeks to resolve and how does the resolution 
accommodate the courts’ preference for going concern value as the core concept of “fair 
value”? The traditional answer supplied by the courts is that appraisal was a statutory 
trade that took away from individual shareholders the right to veto a merger.52 Since a 
merger agreed upon by two boards of directors acting at arm’s-length is presumptively 
value enhancing, the statutory trade removed a possible source of oppression by the 
minority—it deprived minority shareholders of the ability to hold out for non-pro rata 
benefits in order to sell their veto power to the majority. 
Much has changed, however, since the hypothesized statutory bargain was originally 
struck. Today, the current appraisal remedy is limited in reach, applying to situations 
where minority shareholders may be particularly vulnerable.53 The vulnerability does not 
arise, however, if the minority and majority merely disagree over whether a proposed 
merger is actually in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. Instead, the 
 50. See infra Part III.A. 
 51. See, e.g., Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997) (merger effected by 
controlling shareholder Jann Wenner, founder of Rolling Stone magazine); Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., 
Civ. A. No. 19598, 2005 WL 1074364 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005); Cede & Co. v. MedPointe Healthcare, Inc., 
Civ. A. No. 19354-NC, 2004 WL 2093967 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2004); Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 
Inc., Civ. A. No. 12207-NC, 2004 WL 1752847 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004); Ng v. Heng Sang Realty Corp., Civ. 
A. No. 18462, 2004 WL 1151980 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2004); Borruso v. Commc’ns TeleSystems Int’l, 753 A.2d 
451 (Del. Ch. 1999); Ryan v. Tad’s Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682 (Del. Ch. 1996), aff’d, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 
1997); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., Civ. A. No. 11107, 1995 WL 376911 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995); 
Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., Civ. A. No. 11265, 1992 WL 364682 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1992); In re Radiology 
Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
 52. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 893 (Del. 2002); Ala. By-Products Corp. v. Cede 
& Co., 657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995). The historical accuracy of this trade-off story is questionable, however, 
given the fact that the appraisal remedy was often added well after the adoption of statutes permitting mergers 
without unanimous consent. See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in 
Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (1995). 
Appraisal statutes are often presented as having been enacted in tandem with statutes authorizing 
consolidation or merger by less than unanimous vote, but there was a significant difference in the 
spread of the two statutes. By the turn of the century, a dozen states had statutes authorizing 
consolidations for corporations generally, but only five of those states had appraisal statutes. 
Id. On the other hand, even if the trade story did not happen in precisely the manner traditionally suggested, the 
function of the merger statutes and the appraisal remedy to eliminate minority hold-up of value creating 
transactions remains significant.
 53. Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2000); 
Thompson, supra note 52, at 23. 
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vulnerability applies to a more limited range of mergers: specifically, squeeze-out and 
close corporation mergers in which the potential effect of the merger is to enrich the 
majority shareholder at the expense of the minority shareholders. 
As structured, the effect of the remedy is to require that squeeze-out or close 
corporation mergers are transactions that can satisfy a Pareto superior test, under which 
the dissenting shareholders are not made worse off.54 Assuming this is the intent, how 
can it be accomplished? The answer is to pay the dissenting shareholders the cash 
equivalent of the present value of the future benefits that shareholders could have 
expected to receive if they had continued to hold their shares. 
Applying this formulation is not a trivial task, however, and even with its limited 
reach, the appraisal remedy requires a carefully accomplished legal balancing act. Both 
parties have an interest in a legal rule that encourages some individuals or entities to 
become controllers while protecting the interests of the minority shareholders. This 
means that controllers can continue to exercise the rights of control, which, in the context 
of the appraisal and merger statutes, means allowing them to engage in squeeze-out 
mergers or mergers involving close corporations. But it also means protecting minority 
shareholders so they are willing to invest in companies with controllers. In cash-out 
mergers, the rule must insure that the minority shareholders are not made worse off by 
the transaction. 
But minority shareholders also need the controlling shareholders, and would be 
worse off if the legal rules made it unprofitable for controlling shareholders to serve in 
that capacity. The controlling shareholders of the world are non-diversified shareholders 
who take on unsystematic company risk by being incompletely diversified.55 They do so 
in return for the benefits of exercising control. The obvious benefit of having controlling 
shareholders is that agency costs are reduced because the interests of the controller are 
more aligned with the corporation. Minority shares can represent a very profitable 
investment for shareholders who essentially ride the coattails of the nondiversified, and 
hence focused, controlling shareholder. With the correct balance achieved, the controlling 
shareholder can exercise its rights of control, restricted only by a constraint that it pay fair 
value or, in other words, that its actions not make the minority shareholders worse off. 
In order to define that constraint, and to assure that the controller does not make the 
minority shareholders worse off by means of a squeeze-out, we next need to determine 
the main vulnerabilities of the minority shareholders in such a situation. The principal 
concerns of the minority shareholder center on the motive of the controller and the timing 
of the transaction. Why implement the squeeze-out now? Is some good news about to 
occur that would change the value of the company? If this were the case, then the law 
needs to be particularly vigilant that the potential for opportunism by the controller be 
checked. To what extent is the case law sensitive to this situation when it determines the 
“fair value” to be received by the minority shareholders? On the other hand, there are lots 
of other reasons for squeeze-outs that have nothing to do with a forthcoming upward 
valuation of the assets. Does the case law adequately protect the minority shareholders in 
 54. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 139 (1991) (stating that appraisals “require that shareholders receive the equivalent of what 
they give up but do not require sharing of the gain from the change in control”). 
 55. See supra note 51. 
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the former situation, while not over-compensating the minority in the latter situation? 
B. Three Alternative Measures of Fair Value 
Achieving the desired balance through an appropriate measure of fair value has been 
relatively easy, at a conceptual level. For decades, the Delaware case law has adhered to 
going concern value as the correct concept for interpreting fair value.56 That concept 
essentially promises that dissenting shareholders are to receive the value of what was 
being taken from them or, alternatively stated, the value of the benefits they would 
receive if they held the shares indefinitely.57 The breadth and ambiguity of that general 
standard, however, has required the courts to consider the three principal approaches to 
valuation that we discuss below: namely, market value; third-party sale value; and going 
concern value as measured by the present value of future free cash flows. 
1. Market Value 
The advocate of a market value standard for determining fair value asks: if financial 
markets are efficient, why not simply use the market value of the shares as the best 
available measure of fair value?58
For the reasons noted above, using the market price to measure the value of the firm 
is simply not viable for the types of cases to which the appraisal remedy applies. As 
noted, the financial markets will price the firm based on the plans of the controller. If the 
market believes that the controller will under-manage the firm, the price will fall to 
reflect this fact. Critically, the controller is not deterred from doing so since the market 
for corporate control is absent. If the shares’ current market price were used to value the 
firm, the controller would be encouraged to under-manage, since the more it did so, the 
less it would have to pay for the minority interest in a squeeze-out merger. 
Clearly, market price is also not a candidate in one of the other cases where 
 56. The term “going concern value” is standard parlance in the Delaware case law describing the valuation 
standard to be applied in statutory appraisal proceedings. For just a few of the recent instances in which the 
courts used that terminology, see Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 19444-NC, 2004 WL 2847865, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004), aff’d, 875 A.2d 632 (Del. 2005); Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Civ. 
A. No. 19211, 2004 WL 2271592, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2004); Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman 
Co., Civ. A. No. 17802, 2004 WL 2059515, at *25 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004); Lane, 2004 WL 1752847, at *15; 
Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., Civ. A. No. 19734, 2004 WL 1366994, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2004); 
Heng Sang Realty Corp., 2004 WL 1151980, at *4; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 2003 
WL 23700218, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 875 A.2d 602 (Del. 2005); Taylor v. 
Am. Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., Civ. A. No. 19239, 2003 WL 21753752, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003).
 57. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996); see also Cavalier Oil Corp. 
v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989). 
The underlying assumption in an appraisal valuation is that the dissenting shareholders would be 
willing to maintain their investment position had the merger not occurred. Accordingly, the Court 
of Chancery’s task in an appraisal proceeding is to value what has been taken from the 
shareholder, i.e., the proportionate interest in the going concern. 
Id. at 1144 (citing Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)). 
 58. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 332 (making the point that all assets in efficient markets sell for the 
value of their discounted free cash flow); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Adverse Selection and Gains to 
Controllers in Freezeouts, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 247, 250 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); 
Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 351, 370 (1996). 
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appraisal regularly occurs—the close corporation. In this case there is no publicly traded 
market price and there is no check on whether any non-public market transactions sales 
that occur are an accurate indicator of value. In summary, using the public market price 
as the measuring stick for fair value provides inadequate protection for the minority and 
allows for a potential windfall for the controller.59
The law’s rejection of public market prices should not be viewed as a wholesale 
rejection of efficient market theory.60 Quite to the contrary, public market prices are used 
in the appraisal remedy to justify the market-out exception, a significant limitation on the 
scope of the remedy.61 In cases where stock rather than cash is the consideration, 
dissenting shareholders cannot ask for an appraisal of their shares. The usual argument is 
that the market does a more efficient job than the courts in measuring going concern 
value.62
The market-out exception is, however, roundly criticized for lacking a coherent 
scope, being over-inclusive in some cases and under-inclusive in others.63 This criticism 
of the market-out exception is one we agree with. However, it is not a major problem, 
best as we can tell, because of the nature of the deals that might involve appraisal and the 
manner in which the courts handle these deals. 
In third-party initiated mergers between public companies, the market will do as 
good a job in pricing a cash deal as a stock deal. Yet the law provides for appraisal in 
cash deals, but not in stock deals. What matters is not the consideration, but rather 
whether the company is publicly traded or whether there is a controlling shareholder. In 
third-party deals, appraisal is probably not required in either stock or cash deals and 
hence the law is over-inclusive with respect to these transactions.64 However, no problem 
is created because the appraisal court correctly handles these cases, as we shall see 
below.65
In a reorganization forced by a controlling shareholder, the minority can be equally 
disadvantaged whether given stock (for example, nonvoting stock) or cash. In the case of 
 59. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 58, at 250. 
The very power of a controlling shareholder to freeze out the minority shares–and to set the 
freezeout price equal to the prefreezeout market price–will depress the prefreezeout market price 
of the minority shares. As a result, the prefreezeout market price of minority shares will be 
substantially below the expected “intrinsic” value of the minority shares absent a freezeout. 
Id. 
 60. It must be acknowledged, of course, that Delaware valuation case law has always had a strong streak 
of distrust of public market share prices as a dispositive measure of fair value. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858, 875-76 (Del. 1985); Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 456 (Del. Ch. 1934). 
 61. S. SAMUEL ARSHT & LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., THE 1973 AMENDMENTS TO THE DELAWARE 
CORPORATION LAW 372 (1973) (“The theory behind this denial of appraisal rights is that the stockholders have 
a ‘market out’ if they consider the terms of the merger unfair or inadequate since their shares are sufficiently 
widely held to permit ready sale.”). 
 62. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02 cmt. 2 (2005) (The market out provision “is predicated on 
the theory that where an efficient market exists, the market price will be an adequate proxy for the fair value of 
the corporation’s shares, thus making appraisal unnecessary.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 53, at 20-21. 
 64. For a case suggesting that appraisal may be a backstop against deficiencies in the sale process, 
however, see Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 19444-NC, 2004 WL 2847865 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004). 
 65. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 
340 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
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stock, the minority is mistreated by getting too few shares, and in a cash deal the minority 
can be equally mistreated by getting too few dollars. Hence, in this case the law is 
arguably under-inclusive. But here again the lack of perfection is not a major problem 
because of the nature of the deals. In such cases the controller rarely wants to leave the 
minority shareholders in place, so these deals are consummated with cash as the 
consideration and hence appraisal is triggered.66 In particular, where the controller is 
engaging in unjust enrichment of some type, leaving the minority in place will only leave 
a group in place that will have standing to bring suit.67
2. Third-Party Sale Value 
The second candidate for valuing companies in appraisal is to use third-party sale 
value.68 This is a more viable candidate than the market price: one deceptively attractive 
reason to favor third-party sale value is that it seems to accord with the traditional 
economics definition of value. In standard economics, an asset’s value is determined by 
its next best use, or what is referred to as its opportunity cost.69 The economist is 
interested in the cost to society of an asset. The cost to society is what is foregone by 
having the asset’s resources tied up in that fashion, rather than being applied in its next 
best use. The value associated with the next best use is the best measure of the cost to 
society.70
But this opportunity cost definitional construct has no particular claim to serve as 
the preferred measurement of fair value. The financial economist recognizes that the 
“current use value” is a better measure of the value produced by the asset and thus a 
better measure of going concern value. Opportunity cost, on the other hand, does not 
measure the value of what the petitioner has given up in the squeeze-out. 
Moreover, and counter to the intuition that third-party sale value would provide 
greater protection to minority shareholders, opportunity cost as a theoretical concept 
actually results in a lower value. In equilibrium, all value-enhancing transactions have 
already taken place, so that the value to the next best user is actually lower than current 
use value. This is very different from the idea that there are lurking buyers around ready 
to buy the asset for more than the value to the current owners. In fact, most of the time, 
the great majority of firms are not “up for sale” and there is good reason to assume that if 
 66. Of the 30 Delaware appraisal cases since 1983 that did not involve a second-step merger as part of a 
third-party acquisition, only two involved a merger in which the merger consideration prescribed by the 
controlling shareholder was common stock of the controlling shareholder or the surviving corporation. 
Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., Civ. A. No. 19598, 2005 WL 1074364 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005); Hintmann 
v. Fred Weber, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12839, 1998 WL 83052 (Del. Ch. Feb. 17, 1998). 
 67. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ward, 852 A.2d 896, 900-01 (Del. 2004).
 68. See, e.g., In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1004 (Me. 1989). 
The valuation focus under the appraisal statute is not the stock as a commodity, but rather the 
stock only as it represents a proportionate part of the enterprise as a whole. The question for the 
court becomes simple and direct: What is the best price a single buyer could reasonably be 
expected to pay for the firm as an entirety? The court then prorates that value for the whole firm 
equally among all shares of its common stock. 
Id. 
 69. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 16. 
 70. Id. 
[HAMERMESH & WACHTER] FINAL 5/10/2006  4:29:28 PM 
2005] The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law 135 
 
all these firms were put up for sale, at least some would fetch less than going concern 
value. We return to this point below. 
The advocates of third-party sale value, however, do have a point. Since the 
controller can choose the timing of the squeeze-out or close-corporation merger, there is 
at least a concern that the timing puts the minority shareholder at a disadvantage. The 
debate here has similarities to the debate over a related legal rule—the rule that allows 
controllers to sell their own shares (without selling or merging the corporation) without 
providing an equal opportunity to minority shareholders to sell their shares.71 The 
remedy for those concerned about minority oppression in that case is to impose an equal 
opportunity rule.72 By allowing the minority to sell at the same price as the controller, the 
possibility that the controller is acting opportunistically is neutralized. 
However, with respect to freeze-outs and close corporation mergers, there is no 
comparable equal opportunity rule. By its very nature, the transaction is designed to treat 
the majority and minority shareholders differently. The only way to prevent the minority 
from being treated differently, and thus preserve equal opportunity, would be to restrict 
the right of controllers to accomplish freeze-out mergers, which to our knowledge no one 
recommends. 
Rather than essentially prohibit squeeze-out mergers, the alternative remedy favored 
to protect minority shareholders is to define fair value as third-party sale value. If one 
assumes that the controller is or may be “up to no good” in timing the squeeze-out, then 
third-party sale value will be higher than going concern value. While the rule would 
likely lead to an over-compensation of minority shareholders, it would also provide a 
valuation cushion to protect the minority from an under-valuation imposed by the timing. 
But, again, like the equal opportunity rule it has the weakness of preventing mergers that 
enhance value. 
What further renders a third-party sale value rule unattractive is that it violates the 
basic premise of the statutory remedy. The directors get to approve a merger transaction 
they believe is in the best interest of the corporation, but in so doing the minority has a 
remedy that provides them with the value of that which is being taken from them. Third-
party sale value may have the promise of providing greater value to minority 
shareholders, but if one truly adopts that valuation metric, there is no guarantee of that 
result. Third-party sale value might be higher, but it also might be lower than going 
concern value. 
In addition, third-party sale value as a legal rule would also turn on its head the 
relationship between the controller and the minority shareholders. The controller, in order 
to go ahead with the planned transaction, would need to prove to the court that the 
 71. See, e.g., Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1087 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[M]inority 
stockholders . . . have no common or statutory right to tag-along in a transfer of control at the parent level.”); 
Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 305 (Del. Ch. 1994) (“The law has acknowledged, albeit in a guarded and 
complex way, the legitimacy of the acceptance by controlling shareholders of a control premium.”); Zetlin v. 
Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. 1979) (“[A]bsent looting of corporate assets, conversion of a 
corporate opportunity, fraud or other acts of bad faith, a controlling stockholder is free to sell, and a purchaser is 
free to buy, that controlling interest at a premium price.”). See generally Gilson & Gordon, supra note 10, at 
793-94. 
 72. William D. Andrews, The Stockholder’s Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. 
L. REV. 505, 512 (1965). 
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consideration being offered equals the “Revlon price,” that is, the top price that would be 
paid in any reasonably available third-party transaction. This would impose a rule that 
would have outcome similarities to Revlon duties,73 but in this case it would be the legal 
rule that forced the controller to seek a third-party price, or at least to pay the minority 
shareholders the “Revlon price.” As the case law establishes, however, no such legal rule 
exists.74 Imposing a third-party sale rule would undercut this basic right of control, 
presumably making acquisition and ownership of control a much less attractive option 
given the non-diversification risks that it involves. Such a rule would also discourage 
controlling shareholders from buying out minority shares, given the availability of 
alternatives to the costs of public share ownership, such as deregistration and delisting, 
sometimes described as “going dark.”75
There are further problems associated with equating fair value to the “Revlon price.” 
The basic measurement problem of determining the “Revlon price” is that no such 
number may be available. In the case of the equal opportunity rule, the third-party 
offering price to the controller is a known fact. The court does not need to estimate its 
value. The only question is whether the transaction will still take place if the third-party 
has to offer the same price to all shareholders. 
Having the court determine third-party sale value when no such offer has been 
made, on the other hand, imposes additional risk on the transaction as a result of both 
measurement difficulties as well as a core conceptual issue as to whether a higher third-
party sale price could actually exist. Since no third party has made an offer in most of the 
cases, the court would need to construct a market of third-party potential buyers and then 
determine an offering price. This third-party sale valuation exercise is subject to 
significant error and thus introduces a substantial new risk into the process. This risk 
would add a further negative element in the calculus as to whether an otherwise value-
enhancing merger should take place. 
It also should be recognized that a third-party sale value rule imposes additional risk 
on the minority shareholders as well. As noted above, advocates of third-party sale value 
assume that all assets have greater value than their current use. This cannot be true as a 
general proposition. Firms like Microsoft, Berkshire Hathaway, eBay, and many others 
are probably very efficiently run and arguably no third party could do better. Taken 
seriously, imposing a third-party sale value means that the minority takes on the risk of 
being paid less than going concern value. 
Therefore, if the third-party sale value rule were in effect, the result would be to 
create a new potential for controller opportunism. The current concern is that the 
controller will use the squeeze-out when the going concern value is low and about to 
increase. Under a third-party sale value rule the concern would be the converse, namely 
 73. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
 74. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919-20 (Del. 2000); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 
A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987); Orman v. Cullman, Civ. A. No. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395, at *22 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 
2004); Peter Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Shaw, Civ. A. No. 20087-NC, 2003 WL 21649926, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. July 10, 2003), aff'd, No. 384,2003, 2003 WL 22998806 (Del. Dec. 17, 2003). 
 75. See, e.g., Going Dark in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Dec. 20, 2004, at 5; Claudia 
H. Deutch, The Higher Price of Staying Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005; Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms 
Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations (Nov. 2004) (unpublished 
paper, presented at the Am. Fin. Ass’n 2006 Meetings), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=592421. 
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that the controller would time the squeeze-out to occur when third-party sale value is 
arguably lower than going concern value. 
As we will discuss below, on the other hand, there are times when elements of third-
party sale value may indeed be evidence that could be used in an appraisal proceeding. 
3. Going Concern Value 
The third possible measure of fair value, and the one adopted by the courts, is going 
concern value, and a direct measure of that concept wherever possible. The concept of 
going concern value posits that a shareholder should receive the value of what is taken in 
the merger, namely the returns on the holder’s shares that would have been generated had 
the merger not occurred and the holder continued to hold those shares.76 A direct 
measure of going concern value is entirely consistent with the way modern finance 
calculates the value of the asset or a company. Although the term “intrinsic value,”77 a 
favorite of the court, is not used in finance, a close cousin, fundamental value, is used.78 
The value of an asset is measured by the benefits it provides to the owner. For stock in a 
corporation, the benefits are the discounted stream of dividends plus the appreciation in 
the value of the stock, that is, the DCF value mentioned above. Alternatively, but giving 
the same answer, the value can be measured as the discounted value of the free cash 
flows generated by the company’s assets.79
The DCF analysis is a forward looking concept, dependent on the future value of the 
free cash flows. The future free cash flows can be divided into two components. The first 
component is the free cash flows generated by the assets already owned by the firm. 
Although the future cash flows can vary with the business cycle and industry conditions, 
the current asset base of the company is known, and there are various methods of 
determining the value of the free cash flows that it will generate that are consistent with 
DCF analysis.80
The term going concern, as developed and applied by the courts, is, on reflection, 
unduly limited in relation to properly understood DCF analysis. The term “going 
concern” conjures up a picture of a firm with a fixed capital stock that is owned by the 
firm and is fully known at the time of the valuation exercise. Although this may have led 
some to focus unduly on this first component of the analysis—returns generated by assets 
already owned by the firm—the currently owned capital is only the first of two 
components. 
Typically a company that is generating free cash flow does not pay it all out in 
dividends, but instead reinvests at least some of the money.81 Consequently, the present 
 76. See, e.g., Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000) (“The underlying assumption 
in an appraisal valuation is that the dissenting shareholders would be willing to maintain their investment 
position had the merger not occurred.”). 
 77. See, e.g., id. (citing Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950)); Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 
A. 452, 456 (Del. Ch. 1934). 
 78. Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. 787, 798 (2003) (“[T]he corporation’s fundamental value is the sum of the free cash flows 
generated by the company’s assets.”). 
 79. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 80. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 72. 
 81. Id. at 415. 
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value of the firm is not only the free cash flows from the existing assets, but also the free 
cash flows that will be earned on the new investments. The return on the reinvestment of 
the firm’s free cash flow is the second component of the analysis. This second element 
can easily be as large as or larger than the first, but in any case it cannot be ignored. In 
finance textbook terminology, this second element is the present value of the firm’s 
growth opportunities.82 In total then, the firm can be divided into the present value of a 
level stream of earnings based on the current assets and the present value of the growth 
opportunities generated by reinvestment opportunities. 
This breakdown of value into the two components is different from and should not 
be confused with the other two-part division found in many appraisal cases. In the latter 
two-part division there is an initial period where annual forecasts are available on the key 
parameters and a terminal value where one resorts to an estimate about future growth and 
discount rates applicable in the future.83 The reinvestment opportunity component in our 
categorization can begin to occur next year and will continue into the future. It is not an 
overlapping concept with terminal value. Indeed, as we shall see below in our analysis of 
appraisal cases, the critical reinvestment opportunities are likely to have a significant 
effect on value by affecting the cash flows during the period when annual forecasts of the 
key parameters are available.84
The upshot is that in valuing the firm, one is not only valuing the current asset stock 
and the return on those assets; the value of the firm also includes the reinvestment in new 
assets and the return on those new assets. Corporate reinvestment opportunities are thus 
an ongoing business matter that is regularly occurring as the firm considers how to 
reinvest its free cash flows. 
As we shall see, it is these reinvestment opportunities that are at the heart of the 
most difficult appraisal cases. The problem occurs when the controller squeezes out the 
minority shareholders in anticipation of taking advantage of the new reinvestment 
opportunities available to the firm. Although the court has grappled unevenly with 
whether these values should be included in the analysis, the finance perspective would 
say that they should be included as long as they are known to the controller and are part 
of the corporate policy of the existing firm before the merger. Since the finance models 
do not distinguish between explicit and implicit or even hidden corporate plans, the 
valuation exercise should include the firm’s reinvestment opportunities that are known to 
the controller whether or not they are disclosed to anyone else at that time. Consequently, 
the correct calculation of the value of the firm includes the discounted free cash flows 
from these opportunities.85
The law should, and usually does, give the same answer. If the minority 
shareholders were not being squeezed out, they would continue to hold the stock into the 
future. What they lose in the squeeze-out is thus the discounted value of the free cash 
flows of both the original assets and the return on the reinvestment opportunities. These 
shareholders then can be made no worse off, as long as they are paid their proportional 
share of that discounted value. In short, the shareholders are paid the value of what has 
 82. Id. at 73. 
 83. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. No. 18648-NC, 2004 WL 286963, at *4-5 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004). 
 84. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 71. 
 85. Id. at 508. 
[HAMERMESH & WACHTER] FINAL 5/10/2006  4:29:28 PM 
2005] The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law 139 
 
been taken from them. 
From a welfare perspective, the going concern value rule provides the minority 
shareholders with the value of what was taken from them, and therefore, makes the 
transaction Pareto-superior. This requires that the going concern value be correctly 
measured. Although this is a difficult task, it is manageable. A third-party sale value rule 
is arguably intended to make the minority shareholders better off than if the controller 
had not initiated the transaction, by providing the minority shareholders with a higher 
value based on what a third party would offer. As noted earlier, however, the third-party 
sale value rule introduces a gamble into the process because the minority shareholders 
will be paid a construct that the court must estimate. This is not only a difficult task, but 
may not be manageable, and is in any event inconsistent with the right conferred upon the 
controlling shareholder to refrain from selling control to a third party. Moreover, as we 
show in the discussion of the cases,86 we believe that our inclusion of reinvestment 
opportunities resolves many of the troubling cases that lead commentators to favor third-
party sale value. 
C. Agency Costs 
Before proceeding to our delineation of the categories of appraisal situations and the 
appropriate valuation standards, one more foundational question needs to be explored: 
namely, how do agency costs affect the valuation calculation? Agency costs are those 
costs that arise because of the separation of management and control and the resulting 
imperfect alignment of the interest of the shareholders and the directors. 
Agency costs are sometimes viewed as a market failure in the sense that if directors 
and managers could be policed without cost, agency costs would disappear. But this 
definition suffers from the obvious fact that policing directors and managers is not 
costless.87 In a sense, all costs could be defined away if we assumed a perfect world. 
Copper is costly because of the need to extract it. In a perfect world, extraction costs 
would be zero and producing copper in pure form would be as free as monitoring 
directors and managers. More closely analogous to agency costs are information costs. 
But information gathering is costly just as monitoring and bonding are costly. Devising 
legal rules based on unrealistic assumptions as to transaction costs is not useful. 
This is not the place to get into a philosophical debate between real costs in a real 
economy and hypothetical and lower costs in a perfect economy without transaction 
costs. We note, however, that ever since the pathbreaking article of Jensen and Meckling, 
it has been assumed that agency costs are real costs and are borne by the controller when 
it sells shares publicly.88 First, what we refer to as agency costs are really the residual 
costs that continue after the economic actors and society determine the efficient level to 
spend on monitoring and bonding. Those residual agency costs reflect the nonalignment 
that continues after monitoring and bonding occur. Second, informed shareholders 
 86. See infra Part IV.C. (discussing the case law). 
 87. Indeed, important occupations in the American economy, from stock analysts to rating agencies, are 
based at least in part on the real need for principals to monitor agents and for agents to bond their behavior. 
 88. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (stating that agency costs arise upon sale of equity to non-
managers). 
[HAMERMESH & WACHTER] FINAL 5/10/2006  4:29:28 PM 
140 The Journal of Corporation Law [Fall 
 
understand that managers and directors sometimes act in their own interest rather than in 
the interest of the corporation, and shareholders will therefore pay less for firms’ shares 
when they are sold to the public. 
Since agency costs are, after all, real costs, they directly reduce the future free cash 
flow by reducing future revenue streams or increasing future costs.89 Consequently, the 
agency costs are built into the DCF analysis used to determine going concern value. In 
this sense, shareholders pay going concern value when they purchase shares. 
For appraisal, the implications of principal-agent theory are clear. If, as predicted, 
shareholders buy shares at a price that is net of agency costs, then that discount should 
not be added back in when the firm is taken private. We believe that there is general 
agreement as to this point. If there is disagreement, it is over the effect of such a rule on 
efficiency; specifically, does it encourage managers and directors to increase agency 
costs?90 The answer to this question depends on understanding the implications of 
principal-agent theory. The remaining residual agency costs are an equilibrium result that 
depends on the legal system as well as the monitoring and bonding of the private actors. 
It is the legal rules that determine what behavior violates the fiduciary duty of managers 
and directors that determine the level of the remaining or residual agency costs. What 
constitutes faithless behavior by fiduciaries should be and is determined by fiduciary duty 
law, and the legal standards that result should be, and are, enforced. The appraisal remedy 
is not well designed to set the boundaries of fiduciary duties of controllers.91
This then directs us to a resolution of the efficiency implications of the appraisal 
rule. Behavior that reflects a violation of fiduciary duties should not be permitted to 
 89. For a detailed discussion of estimating the value of a company in the presence of agency costs, see 
Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Why Defer to Managers? A Strong-Form Efficiency Model (Univ. 
of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 05-19, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=803564. 
The agency problem means that revenue is lower than it otherwise would be (because managers and directors 
do not work as hard as they do in the perfect economy), costs are higher (because managers do not bargain as 
hard with suppliers), investments are made without the sharpest eye on profitability (because managers may 
want to manage larger firms), or for many other reasons. The result of these effects is that revenue is lower and 
costs are higher, and therefore, value is lower than it otherwise would be in a perfect economy where agency 
costs did not exist. In other words, these effects would result in a lower DCF value. But the amounts involved 
are unknown and probably unknowable. One reason that agency costs are unknowable is because there is no 
reason to presume that a controller who owns one hundred percent of the firm will maximize the value of the 
corporation. The one hundred percent controller can shirk, make fun investments that are not profitable, and do 
lots of other things that she may enjoy and cause her to maximize her utility (if not her profits). Since the 
controller bears all the costs of these adventures, we do not call this the same behavior when done by a 
controller of an agency cost. 
 90. We highlight that this is a hypothetical question since no one has an estimate of the costs involved. 
 91. In his article on control premiums, John Coates describes agency costs as arising from three sources: 
synergy value, expropriation value, and pure control value. Our discussion of synergy value is close to his. But 
Coates describes expropriation value as including not only fraud, theft, and breach of fiduciary duty, but also a 
gray area that includes costs that do not breach a fiduciary duty. Such costs hardly represent expropriation or 
even wrongdoing. While we would agree that expropriation costs, properly defined, should be added back into 
the value of the firm for appraisal purposes, the same is not true for these other costs. Coates also has another 
term that he calls “pure agency cost.” The agency costs that do not breach a fiduciary duty are better viewed as 
pure agency costs, where we define the term to mean the residual agency costs that remain after the parties’ 
monitoring and bonding costs are set at their efficient levels and society sets the appropriate enforcement of 
breach of fiduciary duty. John C. Coates, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority 
Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1274 (1999). 
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lower the fair value that petitioners receive in appraisal. However, after going concern 
value is calculated as the discounted value of the free cash flows, no upward adjustment 
should be made to reflect an estimate of the entirely hypothetical level of residual agency 
costs that are assumed to remain in the system.92
D. Three Prototypical Case Patterns 
With the foregoing background, we now find it useful to differentiate among three 
categories of transactions. In the first category, the current managers sell the company in 
an arm’s-length transaction to a new controller who is taking the company private and 
thus squeezing out the shareholders. In the second, the current controller decides to take 
the company private and the evidence indicates that the controller has no intention to run 
the company any differently after the merger. Finally, in the third category, the current 
controller decides to take the company private and the evidence indicates that the 
controller will use the assets differently than the company has been using them. The third 
problem is clearly the most difficult to solve, but each raises interesting and important 
questions of appraisal. 
1. Category 1: Merger Involving a Third Party 
In this first category, the firm being appraised (Seller Co.) is being merged with 
Buyer Co., a third party entirely separate from Seller Co. and its controller. Buyer Co. is 
interested in buying the assets because of synergies, which means that when the assets of 
the two firms are combined they are worth more when managed together than when 
managed separately. In what way can the minority shareholders be disadvantaged in this 
case? What are our specific concerns? The short answer is that we are not much 
concerned as long as the deal is a true third-party transaction.93 This is an important 
caveat. In true arm’s-length deals, the controller of Seller Co. has every incentive to sell 
the firm for the highest possible price.94
Assuming that Seller Co. bargains at arm’s-length, it is likely that the synergies of 
 92. See Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Civ. A. No. 19211, 2004 WL 2271592 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 30, 2004). 
Before using Sherman’s DCF in the final computation, however, the court will remove the control 
premium. A DCF is a final valuation that does not need any additional correction, such as a 
control premium. Sherman had already corrected for Price’s control of MCHC by modifying his 
inputs. Accordingly, the court will not include Sherman’s additional control premium in its final 
valuation. 
Id. at *17. The court also states that “Delaware courts generally do not apply control premia to DCF 
valuations.” Id. at *7 (citing Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., Civ. A. No. 19239, 2003 WL 
21753752, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003)). See also SHANNON PRATT, THE LAWYER’S BUSINESS VALUATION 
HANDBOOK 359 (2000) (“[DCF] value should represent the full value of the future cash flows of the business. 
Excluding synergies, a company cannot be worth a premium over the value of its future cash flows. Thus, it is 
improper and illogical to add a control premium to a DCF valuation.”). 
 93. See M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 796 (Del. 1999) (“Values derived in the open 
market through arm’s-length negotiations offer better indicia of reliability than the interested party transactions 
that are often the subject of appraisals under § 262.”).
 94. See, e.g., Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7046, 1991 WL 29303, at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
7, 1991). 
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the merger will be shared by the shareholders of the two companies.95 As a consequence 
of the synergies and the arm’s-length deal, Seller Co.’s minority shareholders will 
actually receive what we usually refer to as third-party sale value. In effect, the minority 
receives more than going concern value. This result is likely to hold whether or not Seller 
Co. has a controlling shareholder or whether Buyer Co. has a controlling shareholder. 
This first category accounts for relatively few actual appraisal cases.96 The reason 
for the paucity of such cases is easy enough to explain. Since the remedy provides going 
concern value and the shareholders are in fact receiving the higher amount (third-party 
sale value), the likely award in appraisal will be a lower amount than the dissenting 
shareholder will receive by voting in favor of the merger and taking the merger price.97 
Where the case does occur is in those situations where Seller Co. is closely held and there 
is no public market for the shares. Without any market benchmark, disagreements about 
the actual value of the company may span an especially broad range. The minority 
shareholder may believe that the company was incompletely shopped and that the 
resulting sale price was actually lower than going concern value.98
What policy concerns do we have in this situation with respect to the treatment of 
the minority shareholders? One concern might be that the controller in the closely held 
firm did not do a good job in selling the company. Any legal concern, however, is 
 95. Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating 
that “acquirers typically share a portion of synergies with sellers in sales transactions”). 
 96. Only 9 of more than 45 Delaware appraisal cases since Weinberger arose out of arm’s-length 
acquisitions. 
 97. Union Illinois exemplifies this treatment—unfortunate for the dissenting shareholders, to be sure, but 
appropriate in our view. Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 364 (setting a merger price of $9.40 per share, plus 
contingent payments, and an appraisal award of $8.74 per share); see also Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan 
Corp., Civ. A. No. 11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (a merger price of $6.50 per share 
and an appraisal award of $5.94 per share). As we explain elsewhere, infra Part IV.A.3., the award in Gholl v. 
eMachines exceeded the merger price because of the court’s view that the auction was improperly curtailed in 
favor of an insider bidder. Gholl v. eMachines, Civ. A. No. 19444-NC, 2004 WL 2847865, at *16 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 24, 2004). Until the most recent reversal by the Delaware Supreme Court, the appraisal awards by the 
court of chancery in the Technicolor saga were similarly below the merger price. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 2003 WL 23700218 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), rev’d, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005) (setting a 
merger price of $23 per share and an appraisal award of $21.98 per share, which was raised on appeal to $28.10 
per share). Like Gholl, however, Technicolor can easily be seen as a case in which the ultimate award exceeded 
the merger price because of some judicial concern about the efficacy of the sale process. See Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 369-70 (Del. 1993). Similarly idiosyncratic reasons largely explain the fact 
that in other arm’s-length merger appraisal cases, appraisal awards have run from 12.5% to 247% above the 
merger consideration. See Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., Civ. A. No. 17802, 2004 WL 
2059515, at *35 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (determining the 247% premium by reference to the merger date value 
of Sunbeam common stock given as consideration in the merger, where the back-end merger was delayed for 
almost two years because of accounting fraud); Gentile v. SinglePoint Fin., Inc., Civ. A. No. 18677-NC, 2003 
WL 1240504, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2003) (awarding a 124% premium over the estimated value of acquirer’s 
stock paid in the merger, where the respondent did not defend the litigation and did not present a valuation 
case); Gilbert v. M.P.M. Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 663 (Del. Ch. 1997), aff’d, 731 A.2d 790 (Del. 1999) (finding 
that the merger consideration included both an up-front cash payment and even larger potential future earnout 
payments and setting the appraisal award above the up-front cash component by 149%); Cooper v. Pabst 
Brewing Co., No. 7244, 1993 WL 208763, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993) (setting the appraisal award at 12.5% 
over the second-step merger price, but the second step was the back end of a front-loaded bid with a blended 
value of $29.50, which was $2.50 greater than the amount of the appraisal award). 
 98. See Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *15-16. 
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mitigated by the fact that absent evidence to the contrary, the interests of the controller 
and the minority shareholders are aligned. Markets rather than courts are better at judging 
the adequacy of third-party sale values. As a result, the appraisal remedy in this context is 
truly an extra remedy above and beyond what the minority shareholder might otherwise 
expect. 
One might ask why the appraisal valuation standard in this case should not be third-
party sale value, since the company is indeed being sold. One answer is the legal one—
the governing statute says that value created by the merger should not be included in 
valuing the firm. The economic answer is the same. If the value of the synergies were to 
be included in the fair value calculation, then mergers would not take place since the 
buyer would have to part with all of the benefits of the merger. Moreover, if such a rule 
were in place, there would be no incentives for potential buyers to expend the resources 
to identify possible merger opportunities. 
Leaving the legal rule as going concern value, however, does not mean that the 
minority shareholders will not get some of the value of the synergies. If the merger is 
arm’s-length then the buyer and seller will apportion the value of the synergies between 
them. In fact there is substantial evidence that much of the synergistic value arising from 
the merger is captured by the selling shareholders.99 But the sharing of the gains should 
be and can be fairly decided by the market and by the negotiators who represent the 
parties. In other words, the shareholders effectively receive the third-party sale value as a 
result of the agreement between the third-party buyer and the controller. 
2. Category 2: Squeeze-Out Merger Where the Company Will Continue to be Operated as 
Before the Merger 
The second category is a very different one. Now it is the managers, typically the 
controllers, of the corporation who are squeezing out the minority shareholders. In this 
second category, the evidence indicates that the company will be run in the same way 
after the squeeze-out as before. For example, the squeeze-out may be related to 
disagreements between the controller and minority shareholders in a close corporation, 
which hurt the company’s performance. Alternatively, the transaction may take a public 
company private in order to avoid the costs associated with remaining public.100
In these cases, there is likely to be increased profitability, but the increase in profits 
is directly related to the recapitalization, not to a change of corporate policy with respect 
to investment in assets. The presumed gain in profits, however, carries increased risk, 
taken by the resulting less-diversified controller. 
There is still a host of measurement problems involved in the DCF-based calculation 
of the value of the firm. The company, with all of its warts and diamonds, is valued in 
terms of the discounted free cash flow generated by the company’s assets and 
reinvestment opportunities. In measuring the value of the warts and diamonds, the warts 
are valued as warts and the diamonds as diamonds. The minority shareholders cannot 
claim that if the company was run differently, or if a third party owned it, the warts 
 99. See Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 112 
(2001); Sara B. Moeller et al., Do Shareholders of Acquiring Firms Gain From Acquisitions? 32 tbl.4 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9523, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=383560. 
 100. See Koenig, supra note 8, at 512-13. 
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would become diamonds. That may be correct as a factual matter, but it is irrelevant to 
the valuation issue. The minority’s claim is equal to the value of the shares into the 
future, and that value is a mix of the existing warts and diamonds. 
Similarly, the controller cannot claim that the diamonds are really warts. More 
specifically, if the company already has reinvestment plans that would fix current 
problems, the value reflects the value of those plans of the company as an operating 
concern. 
The second category highlights the need for going concern value rather than third-
party sale value. If the latter was the standard, the value enhancing transactions might not 
occur because the controller is not selling the firm and it may not be realizing anywhere 
near the benefits that a judge might decide would constitute third-party sale value. 
But what if the controller is up to no good after all? At one level, the answer to this 
question is that appraisal is not the remedy designed for this problem. The issue is better 
handled as a suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty. However, we also believe that our 
method for calculating going concern value, which highlights any reinvestment plans that 
may already be in the works, reduces this problem.101
The serious cynic would respond that our proposal, with its focus on pre-merger 
reinvestment plans, fails to acknowledge that the controlling shareholder could keep such 
plans a secret until the appraisal proceeding concludes, thereby preventing the minority 
shareholders and the courts from accounting for those plans’ values. Several reasons, 
however, suggest that this sort of concealment would be unlikely. First, document 
discovery can ordinarily yield evidence of any significant pre-merger business planning 
by the controlling shareholder. Also, it seems unlikely that such planning could be 
meaningfully undertaken without some related documentation generation. Second, it 
would be impractical—indeed, downright costly—for a controlling shareholder to delay 
any implementation of a valuable reinvestment and change in operations for the three 
years or so during appraisal proceedings.102 Third, courts sensitive to the potential for 
concealment and delay of pre-merger reinvestment plans could and should be liberal in 
permitting discovery of post-merger operational changes, at least in situations involving 
squeeze-outs by controlling shareholders.103
 101. See infra Part IV.D. 
 102. The average duration of the Delaware appraisal cases since 1983 (when Weinberger was decided), 
from transaction date to date of award, has been approximately five years. Even excluding outlier cases lasting 
over ten years, such as Technicolor, which has been going on for more than 22 years, the average appraisal 
proceeding lasts nearly four years (about three years, ten months). For purposes of this discussion, of course, the 
relevant duration is the period from the transaction through the close of discovery. The latter benchmark surely 
occurs earlier than the award itself, but the observed length of the overall proceedings suggests that discovery in 
appraisal proceedings continues for a long time after the merger. 
 103. The Delaware courts have in fact shown considerable liberality regarding discovery of post-merger 
events. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 499 n.91 (Del. 2000); Gonsalves v. Straight 
Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 362 (Del. 1997) (“[P]ost-merger evidence is not necessarily inadmissible 
to show that plans in effect at the time of the merger have born [into] fruition.”); In re Best Lock Corp. S’holder 
Litig., Civ. A. No. 16281, 2000 WL 1876460, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2000) (“Cede, in particular, as well as 
other cases, ha[s] relaxed significantly the limitations on discovery of post-merger evidence that may be 
admissible in certain circumstances even in appraisal cases that are statutorily limited to determining fair price 
at the time of the merger.”); Gower v. Beldock, Civ. A. No. 14387, 1998 WL 200267, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 
1998) (allowing discovery of documents during the period of 27 months after the squeeze-out transaction); 
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Civ. A. No. 7959, 1988 WL 15816, at *14 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988) (stating that 
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A final question is why the controller and not the minority shareholders get the 
benefits that make the squeeze-out profitable. Again, the benefits are those arising from 
the recapitalization. This is a subtle issue, but our earlier discussion of agency costs 
supplies an answer. As previously explained, from a finance perspective the controller 
who first takes a firm public sells the shares at a discount reflecting the agency costs that 
will arise in public ownership. In going private, the controller is simply recapturing the 
value of those costs. Having bought the shares at a discount, reflecting the agency costs, 
the minority shareholders do not get to capture those costs when the firm goes public.104 
The case law answer, as we shall see, is more confused, but the short answer is that 
agency costs are an ongoing cost of the firm in its pre-squeeze-out existence. In a DCF 
calculation, the agency costs appear as higher management costs, perhaps due to slack in 
how tightly other costs are controlled, and due to other reasons. In other words, agency 
costs are real costs of doing business and thus are built into the DCF calculation. 
3. Category 3: Squeeze-Out Merger Where the Company Will be Operated Differently 
The third category is the difficult one that generates the cases that are conceptually 
complicated (as distinct from measurement complicated). As in the cases in the second 
category, the controller is unilaterally implementing the cash-out merger. Unlike the 
cases in the second category, however, there is evidence that the controller’s plans call 
for different types of investments that would make the company more profitable and 
arguably different from the current company. This aspect makes this category of cases 
similar to those in the first category. 
The law awards going concern value in all three categories. In the first category, 
however, the minority shareholders receive something akin to third-party sale value 
through the workings of the market mechanism. In the second category, the minority 
shareholders receive no benefits from the squeeze-out, largely because the only benefits 
are those associated with the recapitalization itself. The company’s operations will not 
become more efficient. How do the minority shareholders fare when going concern value 
is applied in the third category? 
“post-merger data may be considered” if it meets the Weinberger standard pertaining to non-speculative 
evidence), aff’d, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989); Dalton v. Am. Inv. Co., Civ. A. No. 6305, 1983 WL 18009 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 16, 1983) (allowing discovery of certain documents for up to 36 months after the merger); Ross v. 
Proco Mgmt., Inc., Civ. A. No. 6146, 1983 WL 17991 (Del. Ch. May 25, 1983); Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., Civ. A. 
No. 1981 WL 15072 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 1981) (permitting discovery of documents generated up to three years 
after a merger because such post-merger evidence might prove the value of matters that were in progress prior 
to the merger); Tannetics, Inc. v. A.J. Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 5306, 1979 WL 2700, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 17, 
1979) (taking into account a contract that was awarded after the merger because established “market 
dominance” was held to have assured its award). Even the most restrictive of the Delaware cases allowed 
discovery of information for the period of a year following the merger. Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 
Inc., Civ. A. No. 12207, 1994 WL 263558, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 25, 1994).
 104. Compare Brett A. Margolin & Samuel J. Kursh, The Economics of Delaware Fair Value, 30 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 413, 434 (2005) (acknowledging that expected agency costs are impounded in the market price of the 
firm’s shares, but positing that fair value should be determined without netting such agency costs in order “to 
enforce the promises by which the corporation induces higher stock prices”). We disagree with Margolin and 
Kursh because shares cannot be sold, and do not trade, at levels that fail to account for expected agency costs. 
Any fair value awarded that compensated for expected agency costs would therefore confer a windfall upon 
minority shareholders. See supra Part III.C. 
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How should the potential increase in valuation be handled in the case where the 
squeeze-out is being done by the current controller? Here, there is an air of inequity. In 
the first category, the benefits are brought to the table by the third party. Even so, the 
minority shareholders gain. Here, the gains are brought to the table by the controller who, 
prior to the squeeze-out, had a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders. Who walks 
away with the profit? If the controller could simply choose the moment to squeeze out the 
minority when the fortune of the firm was about to improve, the result would be to 
discourage minority shareholders from becoming minority shareholders and upset the 
balance that protects minority shareholders while allowing the controller to retain the 
benefits of control. 
This problem is illustrated in the well-known cornfield story, or at least our version 
of the story.105 The story begins with a cornfield that is the only asset owned by the 
corporation. At the present time, the asset is worth $50 million as a cornfield, which is 
thus the value of the company. The controller, who is also the CEO, comes to recognize a 
new investment opportunity that can profitably turn the cornfield into a valuable office 
building. Before taking the required actions to accomplish that conversion, the CEO-
controller decides to squeeze out the minority shareholders in a merger, converting the 
minority shares into cash equal to the pro rata value of $50 million, the value of the 
company managed as a cornfield. It is known that the value of the company will be $60 
million after the conversion. As mentioned in Part II, the statute suggests that the increase 
in value arising from a merger cannot be included in the appraised value. The Delaware 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Weinberger, however, seems superficially 
inconsistent and overly broad, by instructing that those values must be included if they 
are non-speculative. 
In our view, any inconsistency is resolved in light of a more nuanced appreciation of 
the pertinent finance perspective, and an introduction of principles of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine. From a finance perspective, the value of the company in appraisal is 
the full $60 million, given the critical assumption that the opportunity arises and the plan 
to develop the cornfield is made prior to the merger. Remember that the company is 
worth not only the present value of the free cash flow from its current assets, but also the 
free cash flows generated by the reinvestment strategy that it pursues. The development 
of the cornfield is a reinvestment of the company’s free cash flow and, although the 
actual investments are not made until after the squeeze-out, the plans are in place before 
the squeeze-out. In the finance calculation, the fact that the investment is made after the 
squeeze-out is not a complexity since the entire value of the corporation depends on the 
future free cash flows. Nor is it a complexity that the asset (the office building) will not 
be built for a number of years. Again, the value of the firm in appraisal includes the value 
of reinvestments made annually into the future. 
A legal perspective yields the same result. Assumed in the above hypothetical are 
several elements that are critical in the legal doctrine of corporate opportunity. The 
cornfield is owned by the corporation and the controller arrives at her plans to develop 
the cornfield while serving as the CEO. The other key assumption is that the plan is made 
prior to the squeeze-out, although the plan may not become operational until after the 
 105. Symposium, Delaware Appraisals After Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 17 BANK & CORP. 
GOVERNANCE L. REP. 631 (1996). 
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squeeze-out is accomplished. Given these assumptions, the corporate opportunity 
doctrine would strongly suggest that the potential development of the cornfield into an 
office building is an opportunity that belongs to the corporation and should therefore be 
considered part of the nature of the corporate enterprise at the time of the merger. 
If we change these two assumptions, the result is arguably different, both from a 
finance perspective and a legal perspective. If the controller has the extra time and an 
employment contract that permits her to work outside of the company, she can buy other 
cornfields and turn them into office complexes. In this case, the plan to develop the 
cornfield is not part of the company’s corporate policy. If the controller decides to 
squeeze out the minority and plans to continue to run the company as a cornfield, then the 
company’s going concern value is still worth only $50 million. In this alternative 
scenario, there is nothing special about the cornfield, so that a lot of alternative 
underutilized land could be developed by the enterprising controller with extra time on 
her hands. The squeeze-out merger, when it occurs, is not necessary to enable the 
controller to turn a cornfield into an office building. The only caution here is the obvious 
one that arises if and to the extent that the squeeze-out is necessary to enable the 
controller to turn some other cornfield into an office building.106
The financial valuation comes to a very different result when we change the 
assumption about the timing of the decision. Where there is no evidence that the 
controller is even considering using the company’s free cash flow to build the office 
building—presumably because she does not see the new opportunity or because no such 
opportunity has arisen—and will plow any undistributed free cash flows back into the 
cornfield, then we are clearly back into a category 2 situation (squeeze-out with no 
change in operations) and the company is worth only $50 million in appraisal. 
Based on these hypotheticals, one might conclude that the controller in the second 
situation, who leaves the cornfield as a cornfield, comes across as a short-sighted 
manager for not seizing the new investment opportunity. On the other hand, the manager 
may believe that the investment opportunity does not actually exist and that turning the 
cornfield into an office building is truly a bad investment that would result in a company 
worth less than $50 million.107 But appraisal and finance are not meant to solve any 
management problems. The minority shareholder who bought into the company with the 
current cautious manager gets the value of the company as it is managed by the cautious 
manager. The minority shareholder cannot claim that warts should be turned into 
diamonds and valued as such. The minority shareholder gets the value of the firm with its 
cornfield. 
The problem, of course, is that minority shareholders have incentives to envision 
 106. A separate problem arises if the controller owns multiple cornfields, but has only one opportunity to 
develop an office building, and must choose which cornfield to convert. This is a problem confronted in the 
corporate opportunity doctrine, where a director or officer is a fiduciary for multiple corporations. See, e.g., 
Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 924 (Del. Ch. 1956) (discussing a director’s fiduciary duty to offer up an 
investment opportunity to the corporation when he is a director of multiple corporations); Burg v. Horn, 380 
F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1967) (same). As we explain below, whatever resolution the doctrine of corporate 
opportunity supplies in this situation should also provide useful guidance in resolving the “fair value” gain 
inclusion issue in the scenarios we discuss. 
 107. Although the original hypothetical had the cornfield in the middle of New York City, it is more likely 
that the cornfield is in one of the southern counties of New Jersey where corn is grown and land is cheap. 
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corporate diamonds when there are, in fact, only corporate warts. The law correctly does 
not open the appraisal remedy to the claims of minority shareholders that the company 
would be more valuable if only their ideas had become corporate policy and the warts 
had been transformed into diamonds. 
One can question whether our method for reconciling the statute and case law with 
finance provides sufficient protection of minority shareholders. The answer is that it 
provides a good deal of protection in the appraisal setting. If the minority shareholder 
believes that the controller’s behavior constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty or good 
faith, the shareholder can also mount a case that seeks a remedy for the breach. If the 
facts of the case are of a “cornfield to office building” investment that is truly an 
excellent opportunity, yet is foregone by the controller until after a squeeze-out, there is 
certainly more than a hint of breach of the duty of loyalty. At the very least, however, the 
minority shareholder will be able to recover a proportionate share of the benefits, 
discounted to present value, that are reasonably expected to be generated by the company 
based on its existing assets and its expected reinvestment opportunities. 
IV. DELAWARE CASE LAW CORROBORATES THE PROPOSED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the preceding section we developed an approach to measuring fair value when 
shareholders objecting to a merger seek an appraisal remedy. We believe that those 
assertions are consistent with the Delaware case law defining the concept of “fair value” 
for purposes of Delaware’s appraisal statute. In several instances, in fact, we believe that 
our approach simply echoes settled judicial articulations of valuation standards. In other 
cases, however, we believe that the case law, while not inconsistent with our approach, 
has not fully developed appropriate doctrinal guidance. In this section we analyze the 
extent to which case law is consistent with the conclusions we reached in the prior 
section and offer, where relevant, guidance for use in future cases. 
A. Category 1 Cases 
“Fair value” in a sale to a third party excludes any gains arising from the merger and 
is not equivalent to third-party sale value. However, third-party sale value minus 
synergies is informative of fair value except when the sale process is flawed. 
1. Gains Arising from the Merger: Synergistic/Combinatorial Benefits 
Of all the claims we make, the assertion that “fair value” excludes gains arising from 
the merger itself is the most clearly established and visible in Delaware law. That 
assertion, after all, is precisely what the governing statute says. Section 262(h) of the 
DGCL prescribes a determination of “fair value” that excludes “any element of value 
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”108 This prohibition 
excludes from “fair value” gains associated with the combination of two enterprises 
whose merger gives rise to the valuation proceeding. Such excluded gains include, for 
example, those resulting from economies of scale or increased market share, or those that 
derive from the acquirer’s plans to operate the post-merger enterprise more efficiently. 
 108. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2005). 
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Representative of the cases reflecting this application of section 262(h)’s prohibition 
is Union Illinois, in which the court determined “fair value” by reference to the merger 
price, but net of estimated synergies.109 The court explained this subtraction of 
anticipated synergies as follows: 
The exclusion of synergy value . . . derives from the mandate that the subject 
company in an appraisal be valued as a going concern. Logically, if this 
mandate is to be faithfully followed, this court must endeavor to exclude from 
any appraisal award the amount of any value that the selling company’s 
shareholders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject 
company, not as a stand-alone going concern, but as a part of a larger 
enterprise, from which synergistic gains can be extracted.110
Through a wooden interpretation, one could draw a contrary inference from the 
previously quoted language, as in Weinberger, where the Delaware Supreme Court, in 
interpreting the scope of the section 262(h) exclusion, stated that “elements of future 
value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or susceptible of proof as 
of the date of the merger and not the product of speculation, may be considered.”111 This 
language, heavily emphasized in the Delaware Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in 
Technicolor would literally permit a dissenting shareholder to claim entitlement to a 
proportionate share of any future value arising from the merger—even economies of 
scale, for instance—as long as such future value were not “speculative” at the date of the 
merger.112
We believe, however, that such a literal reading is not required by the court’s 
statements in Weinberger and Technicolor, and that it is intolerably inconsistent with the 
language of section 262(h) itself. Certainly, the Delaware courts themselves have not 
subsequently embraced such a reading. No case, to our knowledge, holds that non-
speculative synergistic merger gains should be shared with dissenting stockholders in all 
cases. To the contrary, the Union Illinois opinion embraces the view we support.113
We find further support for that view in then Vice Chancellor (now Justice) Jacobs’s 
opinion in Allenson v. Midway Airlines Corp.114 In that case, the merger was part of a 
package of significant debt concessions and equity infusions for a company that was on 
the verge of bankruptcy.115 All of those concessions and infusions were contractually 
committed to before the merger, and were thus anything but “speculative,” but they were 
explicitly contingent upon, and would not occur until after, completion of the merger.116 
Despite the plainly nonspeculative character of the merger-related benefits, the court 
declined to include those benefits in determining “fair value.”117 That ruling followed, as 
the court explained it, from the fact that the corporation and its controlling shareholder 
“neither possessed nor exercised the legal power to implement the Concessions on or 
 109. Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 364 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 110. Id. at 356. 
 111. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) 
 112. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 297 (Del. 1996). 
 113. Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 340. 
 114. Allenson v. Midway Airlines Corp., 789 A.2d 572 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 115. Id. at 572-73. 
 116. Id. at 573. 
 117. Id. at 585-86. 
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before the merger date.”118
In so ruling, the court distinguished the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Technicolor, which relied heavily upon the language in Weinberger quoted above.119 The 
key distinction noted in Allenson is the fact that in Technicolor, the acquirer had begun to 
implement its business plan before the merger, and thereby “had subjected the 
corporation’s minority stockholders to the economic risks that plan posed.”120 In 
contrast, any value attributable to the concessions and equity infusions in Allenson 
“would exist only if and after the merger occurred.”121
The statute supported by the cases thus holds to the position that synergistic gains 
that only occur after the merger, and would not occur otherwise, are not part of the fair 
value or going concern value of the enterprise being appraised. This is in line with the 
traditional efficiency view that the synergistic bidder who can enhance the efficiency of 
the company’s assets cannot be required to pay the value of those gains to the current 
owners lest the bidder not bid and the gains not occur. 
2. Gains Arising From the Merger: Acquirer’s New Business Plans 
Allenson offers another important implication on a point distinct from the matter of 
synergistic or combinatorial merger gains that we have been addressing: namely, the 
question of whether value derived from a third-party acquirer’s new business plans may 
be included in determining the “fair value” of dissenting shares.122 In our view, 
Allenson’s distinction of Technicolor implies that as long as the operational risks of the 
acquirer’s new business plans are not imposed upon minority shareholders before the 
merger, any value derived from those revised business plans is excluded from “fair 
value” by the language of section 262(h).123 That view is also well grounded in the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Technicolor. In that case the supreme court 
emphatically reaffirmed that “fair value” must be measured by reference to “value 
attributable to the going concern, i.e., the extant ‘nature of the enterprise,’ on the date of 
the merger.”124 The only apparent reason for the supreme court’s reversal was its 
 118. Id. at 585. 
 119. Allenson, 789 A.2d at 585. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 585-86. 
 122. Id. at 586. 
 123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2005). 
 124. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996). Thus, the supreme court’s 
Technicolor opinion, supports, rather than undermines, Chancellor Allen’s reasoning underlying his holding 
that an acquirer’s post-merger business plan is ordinarily not to be taken into account in determining fair value. 
Id. In his opinion, Chancellor Allen reasoned as follows: 
[V]alue that arises only from the acquiror’s utilization of the acquired company's assets following 
a merger is, under the statutory language, not a value in which a dissenting shareholder is entitled 
to share as part of “his proportionate interest in a going concern”. . . . Our statute and a long line 
of cases that focus our inquiry on “going concern” value recognize that the value that is relevant 
in an appraisal is the value of the assets in the way they are deployed in the corporation from 
which the shareholder will exit. 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1990, 1990 WL 161084, at *20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990). That 
ruling relied heavily on the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 
142 (Del. 1980), in which that court rejected a valuation approach premised on liquidation by a third-party 
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perception that on the facts of the case, Technicolor was already operating under the 
acquirer’s business plan as of the merger date.125
We conclude from these rulings, and from the statutory exclusion that they interpret, 
that synergies dependent on the consummation of an arm’s-length acquisition or 
combination may not contribute to “fair value” in appraisal proceedings.126 Similarly, we 
conclude that operating efficiencies that arise from the acquirer’s new business plans are 
not properly included in determining “fair value,” as long as they are not operationally 
implemented before the merger, even though they derive solely from the enterprise’s own 
assets. 
3. The Role of Third-Party Sale Value 
The statutorily-based exclusion of synergistic merger gains and gains derived from a 
new acquirer’s alternative business strategies has led to a series of pronouncements in the 
Delaware case law to the effect that the liquidation value of the corporation’s assets 
cannot be the exclusive measure of “fair value” in an appraisal proceeding in which the 
corporation will valued as a going concern.127 Despite the fact that the liquidation value 
of corporate assets is not necessarily the same as third-party sale value, many Delaware 
cases decline to equate “fair value” with the value that might be achieved in a 
acquirer because that approach “presupposes . . . that the company will not continue in business on the same 
basis that existed immediately prior to the merger.” Id. at 142 (quoting Application of Del. Racing Ass’n, 213 
A.2d 203, 207-08 (Del. 1965)). In our view, this reasoning also effectively refutes criticism of the court’s 
decision in Allenson. See Ryan W. Koppelman, Including Non-Speculative Future Value in Delaware Appraisal 
Proceedings: Why the Chancery Court in Allenson Got it Wrong, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 341 (2004) 
(urging that because the concessions were committed to before the merger they were non-speculative and 
therefore should have been taken into account in determining fair value). 
 125. Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 299. 
 126. This view was also the consensus of a group of Delaware practitioners who met in 1996 to discuss the 
implications of the then recent Technicolor opinion. See Symposium, supra note 105, at 641-42, which recounts 
the following exchange: 
PROFESSOR [LAWRENCE] HAMERMESH: . . . [Y]ou are both satisfied that the kind of 
synergy that I’m talking about arising from cost reductions due to the combination are values that 
arise from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger. And even though they are not 
speculative, they need to be excluded in the dissenting stockholders’ appraisal proceeding? 
MR. [DAVID] McBRIDE: Yes. Although I accept the proposition that the language of the 
Supreme Court opinion seems to suggest that future value that’s not speculative can be 
considered, I just don’t believe that the Supreme Court had this sort of hypothetical in mind. 
MR. [A. GILCHRIST] SPARKS: I’m in complete agreement with the two of them, and I get there 
through the same thought processes; namely, that synergies, the opportunity to save money on an 
accountant that you can eliminate only if the merger goes forward, are not included in the 
appraisal. 
The reason for that is that until the merger actually takes place, that is not part of the “nature of 
the enterprise.” That saving is just not available to the corporation until the merger actually takes 
place.  
Id. 
 127. Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 298; In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1219 (Del. 1992); Rapid-Am. Corp. 
v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802-03 (Del. 1992) (“The dissenting shareholders are entitled to receive ‘fair value’ 
representing their ‘proportionate interest in a going concern.’” (quoting Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 
1137, 1144 (Del. 1989))); Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d at 140-42. 
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hypothetical sale of the company.128 We do not quarrel with either of these general case 
law pronouncements. 
On the other hand, the rejection of sale value as an exclusive measure of fair value 
in appraisal does not mean that sale value is entirely irrelevant in determining fair value. 
Even in Kirby Lumber, the Delaware Supreme Court approved the use of a liquidation 
valuation of the corporation’s assets as a significant, albeit nonexclusive, measure of “fair 
value.”129 And as demonstrated more recently in the court of chancery’s excellent 
discussion of the issue in Union Illinois, third-party sale value can be a cornerstone of an 
analysis of fair value as long as synergies are subtracted. In that case Union Financial 
Group was sold to a third-party buyer in a deal that called for an immediate cash payment 
of $9.40 per share and other payments if certain contingencies were met.130 The court 
concluded that the company was sold in “a competitive and fair auction, which followed 
a more-than-adequate sales process and involved the broad dissemination of confidential 
information to a large number of prospective buyers.”131 The Vice Chancellor then 
concluded that he should not second guess the outcome of an auction-determined price, 
and concluded that the fair value was the merger price minus an estimate of the 
synergies.132 By taking this approach, he awarded the minority shareholders less than 
they would have received had they taken the merger price. Importantly, the Vice 
Chancellor also concluded that the minority shareholders presented no reliable alternative 
estimates of fair value.133
 128. See Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 899 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[T]o exclude value that derives from the 
expectation of a synergistic change in control[, this court has] used a necessarily rough approach that simply 
involves shaving some percentage off the top of the available information about control premiums paid.”); 
ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 913 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“[T]his Court will make adjustments for the 
effect of a control premium when it depresses the market value of minority-owned shares, but it will not 
specifically consider studies of control premiums paid in merger transactions because those reflect expected 
future profits after the merger (i.e., synergy values).”); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., Civ. A. No. 
11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (“[T]his Court has rejected the use of a control 
premium derived from merger and acquisition data because the control premium incorporates post-merger 
value.” (citing Salomon Bros., Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., Civ. A. No. 10054, 1992 WL 94367, at *6 (Del. 
Ch. May 1, 1992))); Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Corp., Civ. A. No. 7244, 1993 WL 208763, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. 
June 8, 1993); see also Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. No. 18648-NC, 2004 WL 286963, at *7 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (relying on the corporation’s actual debt to equity ratio rather than the industry norm, 
“because an appraisal proceeding does ‘not attempt[] to determine the potential maximum value of the 
company’” (citing In re Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 494 (Del. Ch. 1991))). “Plaintiff is not entitled 
to the proportionate sales value of Radiology. Plaintiff is entitled to the proportionate value of Radiology as a 
continuing shareholder.” Id. 
 129. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d at 146 (approving a 40% weighting of asset liquidation in determining 
fair value). 
 130. Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 349 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 131. Id. at 358. 
 132. Id. at 359. 
 133. The Delaware Supreme Court has formulated the burden of proof in a slightly different way than the 
articulation in Union Illinois. In M.P.M. Enterprises, the court expressed concern that acceptance of the merger 
consideration as a proxy for “fair value,” without corroboration by other evidence, might inappropriately 
incorporate synergies or other considerations peculiar to the specific buyer. M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 
A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999). 
A merger price resulting from arms-length negotiations where there are no claims of collusion is a 
very strong indication of fair value. But in an appraisal action, that merger price must be 
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As a measure of “fair value,” third-party sale value is not and should not be 
automatically applied. In Gholl v. eMachines, Inc,134 for example, the court found that 
the auction leading to the sale of the company was not effective because it was 
terminated too early and without reason, perhaps because the winning bidder was an 
inside director. In this case, the court reasonably concluded that fair value was above the 
merger price even if the merger price did include synergies.135
Broadly interpreted, these cases stand for the principle that in a fair and effective 
auction with full information, the merger price minus the synergies is the best estimate of 
fair value136 in the category 1 type of cases addressed in this Part.137 Where the auction 
is defective, however, the merger price minus synergies does not provide a reliable 
estimate of fair value. 
There is much to be said for the clarity that recent cases bring to fair value 
determinations in third-party acquisitions.138 Specifically, the price achieved in a full and 
effective sale process, minus the value of the synergies of the transaction, should be 
accepted as providing a reliable estimate of fair value. Although the value of the 
synergies could still be debated, no informed dissenting shareholder would bring suit in 
such a case since the merger price becomes the effective ceiling, and thus, the minority 
shareholders would accept the sale price rather than seek appraisal. 
accompanied by evidence tending to show that it represents the going concern value of the 
company rather than just the value of the company to one specific buyer. 
Id. We believe, however, that the court in Union Illinois dealt appropriately with this concern through its 
insistence on excluding deal-specific synergies in determining fair value. 
 134. Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 19444-NC, 2004 WL 2847865, at *15 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004). 
 135. Id. There seems to be little or no evidence in the case to suggest that the merger price did include 
synergies: the winning bidder was an inside director, rather than a strategic buyer, and there was no indication 
that the director had adopted any plans to alter the ongoing operations of the enterprise. 
 136. Id. at *60-61 (“Price derived from a competitive and fair auction is strong evidence of fair value.” 
(citing Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 357)). This is not to say that third-party sale value, net of estimated 
synergies, is invariably an accurate assessment of fair value. It is possible for bidders to overpay, for a number 
of reasons. Applying third-party sale value, net of synergies, however, at least affords the assurance that 
dissenting shareholders would always be better off accepting the merger price following an effective auction. 
See, e.g., Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 356 (“[T]he fair value standard operates to leave the . . . petitioners . . . 
with less than they would have received had they accepted the Merger consideration.”). The problem of 
overcompensation in appraisal proceedings is therefore likely to be trivial or nonexistent. 
 137. We acknowledge that Gholl v. eMachines does not fit perfectly within any of the three categories we 
outlined in Part III. Because it involved a director and founder acquiring the other stockholders’ shares for cash, 
it resembles “going private” mergers effected by controlling stockholders, the situations addressed in categories 
2 and 3. Because of the absence of any suggestion in the case that the director-bidder intended to alter the 
operations of the company following the merger, we are inclined not to view the case as belonging to our 
category 3; and because there was no suggestion in the case that the director-bidder expected to achieve any 
gains arising from the recapitalization effected by the merger itself, we are not inclined to view the case as a 
category 2 case either. 
 138. We are less enthusiastic about the assertion—now routine in the case law and even in expert testimony 
in many appraisal cases—that public share market prices invariably fall short of fair value or going concern 
value, to the extent of some “implicit minority discount.” See, e.g., Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman 
Co., Civ. A. No. 17802, 2004 WL 2059515, at *28-29 (citing M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d 
513, 522-23 & n.26 (Del. 1999)). The reasons for that lack of enthusiasm are not developed in this Article, but 
several commentators have begun to explore them. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control 
Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 BUS. LAW. 127, 150-51 nn.130, 155 (2001); Coates, supra note 91, at 
1279 n.92.
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However, no such inference should be drawn when the sale process is defective in 
any material way or reliable DCF estimates provide conflicting information. 
Consequently, appraisal in third-party sales would focus on the appropriate issue of the 
validity of the sale process. The dissenting shareholders need not prove breach of 
fiduciary duty, although such a claim is available to them, but only that the sale process 
was defective in some manner. The dissenting shareholders could also succeed if they 
were able to provide reliable DCF estimates that yielded a higher value than the sale 
price. We believe it is unlikely that such a reliable estimate does exist if the sale process 
was effective, but that avenue of analysis should be left open, in part because it serves as 
a check on the hasty acceptance of the sale process as effective. 
B. Category 2 Cases: Controlling Shareholder Squeeze-Out Merger/“Fair Value” Equals 
Going Concern Value Absent Planned Change of Business, and Not Hypothetical Third-
Party Sale Value 
In contrast to the category 1 situation just reviewed, the merger effected by a 
controlling shareholder leaves no role for hypothetical third-party sale value in 
determining “fair value” in appraisal proceedings. As a matter of finance,139 “fair value” 
should be determined on the basis of future free cash flows associated with the going 
concern, including the agency costs inherent in the enterprise prior to the merger. This 
view comports with the well-established principle of Delaware law that minority 
shareholders have no legal right to demand that the controlling shareholder achieve—and 
that they be paid—the value that might be obtained in a hypothetical third-party sale.140
Any temptation to resort to hypothetical third-party sale value may respond to the 
possibility that the controller has some disclosed or undisclosed plan to change the 
corporate enterprise following the merger (by sale, breakup, or otherwise) and thereby 
extract the maximum value from the enterprise, appropriating solely to itself the benefits 
of that change. We believe, however, that a blanket assumption or presumption of such a 
plan is unjustified. A number of appraisal cases arise in situations where the benefit to the 
majority shareholder is generated by the recapitalization associated with the squeeze-out 
and thereafter the firm will continue to be operated much as it had before. These 
scenarios are even more plausible in the case of a publicly held company, if one takes 
into account the potential benefits to the controlling shareholder of dispensing with 
reporting, governance, and other obligations associated with public minority 
ownership.141 We review below some of the Delaware cases in this category, in which 
 139. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 140. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919-20 (Del. 2000) (citing Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 
A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987)); Orman v. Cullman, Civ. A. No. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 
2004); Peter Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Shaw, Civ. A. No. 20087-NC, WL 21649926, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
July 10, 2003), aff'd, No. 384,2003, 2003 WL 22998806840 (Del. Dec. 17, 2003). 
 141. See, e.g., Melinda Ligos, When Going Public May Not Be Worth It, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at C7 
(describing scope of and reaction to enhanced compliance costs imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); 
Emily Thornton, A Little Privacy, Please, BUS. WK., May 24, 2004, at 74 (same); Adrian Michaels, Governance 
Costs Lead 20% of Public Companies to Consider Going Private, FIN. TIMES (London), May 19, 2004, at 1 
(same); Thomas E. Hartman, Foley & Lardner LLP, The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley 12 
(June 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/2777/2005%20Cost%20of%20Being%20Public
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the only apparently possible gains to be extracted from the merger arise because of the 
accomplishment of the merger itself. 
1. Kirby: The Foundational Case 
A leading example in this category, and the leading case declining to define “fair 
value” solely by reference to third-party sale value, is Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.142 In 
that case, the dissenting shareholders claimed that Kirby’s timberland could be put to 
better use and asked that the shares be valued based on the liquidation or sale value of the 
timberland. The concern here is that after the merger, the controller would indeed put the 
company’s land assets to a more immediately profitable use, depriving the minority of the 
benefit of that change. But there were no facts indicating that such a change in operations 
was planned or intended, and thus the court correctly declined to rely exclusively upon a 
liquidation or third-party sale value. 
Indeed, by the time of the merger, the controlling shareholder (Santa Fe Industries) 
had already embarked upon a dramatic restructuring of the business of Kirby Lumber, 
involving construction of new production plants to draw upon and profit from the 
company’s extensive timber resources.143 There is no indication that the controlling 
shareholder did anything in the years following the merger but continue to pursue that 
pre-merger restructuring plan.144 It seems unlikely at best, therefore, that the controlling 
shareholder in that case sought to affect the merger in an attempt to gain unfair advantage 
at the expense of the minority shareholders by means of a post-merger change in business 
plan. At worst, the controlling shareholder might have been taking advantage of 
shortcomings in the Delaware appraisal law that have long since been cured.145
%20Final.pdf. (stating that 21% of public firms considered going private in 2004, up from 13% in 2003). 
 142. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). We examine below whether the judicial 
appraisal in Kirby Lumber employed appropriate techniques for determining the “fair value” of the shares 
subject to appraisal. 
 143. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730, 733 (Del. Ch. 1978), aff’d, 413 A.2d 137 (Del. Ch. 1980). 
There is no question, in light of Technicolor, that the “fair value” of Kirby Lumber shares would have to be 
determined in light of those significant operational changes and plans in place at the time of the merger. 
 144. James Cook, How the Santa Fe Woke Up, FORBES, Nov. 12, 1979, at 49 (describing program of plant 
and product expansion launched in the 1960s). 
 145. At the time Kirby Lumber was decided, the Delaware courts insisted that “earnings value,” an 
analytical cousin to an evaluation based on discounted future returns, be calculated by reference to earnings in 
the full five years preceding the merger, and that was the approach used by the appraiser and the trial court, 
despite drastic changes in Kirby Lumber’s business during that time frame. Kirby Lumber, 413 A.2d at 145. 
Thus, the parent company might have viewed a merger as an opportunity to pay a “fair value” that did not fully 
reflect the actual earnings potential of the subsidiary’s openly disclosed and existing business plans. Id. In his 
concurring opinion, then Justice Quillen appeared to recognize this potential problem and presciently 
questioned the courts’ insistence upon use of long-past earnings in determining “earnings value.” 
[C]ounsel and the courts, through the flexibility implicit in the traditional standard, should 
encourage the legislatively established valuation process to be open to generally accepted 
techniques of evaluation used in other areas of business and law. . . . 
. . . 
. . . [I]n the exercise of independent trial judgment I may have concluded that the five-year 
averaging approach was inappropriate in this case. 
Id. at 151 (Quillen, J., concurring). Justice Quillen’s call for openness to generally accepted valuation 
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2. Kleinwort: Satisfying Conflicting Demands for Liquidity 
Kleinwort Benson146 represents a straightforward recapitalization, and there were no 
allegations that the company’s assets would be used differently, and in a more valued 
manner, after the squeeze-out merger. On the facts reported, the motivation appears to be 
a financial restructuring. The Silgan Company was and would remain a container 
company after it merged into Silgan Holdings. Silgan had two classes of voting stock, A 
and B. The two controllers of Silgan, Philip Silver and Greg Horrigan, controlled 50% of 
the board through their ownership of the A class stock and would continue to own 50% of 
Silgan Holdings after the merger. The merger would allow Morgan Stanley, which 
controlled the other board seats through its two-thirds ownership of the B class shares, to 
cash out at a mutually advantageous price.147 The petitioners, minority shareholders of 
the B class stock, believed that the company’s shares were being undervalued. Their 
claim of undervaluation, however, did not rest on any presumed new use of the assets. 
Instead they claimed that the assets were being capitalized at a lower rate than the assets 
of other container companies. 
3. Borruso: Reconsolidating a Failing Subsidiary 
Borruso v. Communications Telesystems Int’l148 represents another genre of cases 
that fits into our second category. In this type of case a failed subsidiary is being merged 
back into the parent company. In this particular case, both the parent (CTS) and the 
subsidiary (WXL) were privately held telephone companies. WXL was established to 
expand the parent’s reach into Europe. When the subsidiary’s revenue failed to meet 
minimal targets, the squeeze-out merger eliminated the subsidiary as an unprofitable 
independent company, a choice that was preferred to shutting the company down because 
of concern over the reputation of related company operations in other countries. The 
allegations in this case did not involve any claims that WXL’s assets would be used 
differently or in a more valued manner after the squeeze-out merger. Rather the claim 
was that the purchase price was below the subsidiary’s ongoing concern value. The Vice 
Chancellor agreed with the petitioners, finding that the merger price was determined in a 
techniques anticipated the Delaware Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
703 (Del. 1983), in which the court set in motion the modern practice of relying on DCF analyses in 
determining “fair value” in statutory appraisal proceedings. See, e.g., M.P.M. Enters. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 
793-95 (Del. 1999); Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. No. 18648-NC, 2004 WL 286963 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 10, 2004); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 2003 WL 23700218, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
31, 2003); ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 916 (Del. Ch. 1999); Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming 
Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 423 (Del. Ch. 1999); Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., No. 12839, 1998 WL 83052, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 17, 1998); Ryan v. Tad’s Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 702 (Del. Ch. 1996), aff’d, 693 A.2d 1082 
(Del. 1997); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., Civ. A. No. 11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 
15, 1995); Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Corp., Civ. A. No. 7244, 1993 WL 208763, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993); 
Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., Civ. A. No. 11265, 1992 WL 364682, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1992); In re 
Radiology Assocs., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 498 (Del. Ch. 1991); Neal v. Ala. By-Products Corp., Civ. A. No. 8282, 
1990 WL 109243, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990), aff'd, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991). 
 146. Kleinwort Benson, 1995 WL 376911. 
 147. See Peter V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1998) 
(proposing that the appraisal remedy is designed “to reconcile differing shareholder preferences with respect to 
corporate transactions that alter the risk of the firm’s shares”). 
 148. Borruso v. Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l, 753 A.2d 451 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
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haphazard manner. The court relied solely on the comparable company method of 
analysis to derive “fair value.” While the court did add a premium to the result of this 
analysis, it attempted to factor out any element of impermissible post-merger synergy 
value.149
4. Ng: Achieving More Favorable Tax Treatment 
Ng v. Heng Sang Realty Corp.150 involved a squeeze-out merger of a privately held 
real estate company that, prior to the merger, was a subchapter C corporation for federal 
tax purposes. The dissenting shareholder claimed that DCF projections should assume 
that the corporation would be treated, more favorably, as a subchapter S corporation, 
which the corporation evidently did convert to following the merger. Before the merger, 
however, subchapter S treatment was available only if all of the shareholders consented, 
and the dissenter refused to do so. The court concluded that subchapter S status was not 
part of the company’s operative reality at the time of the merger, and therefore the 
company’s “conversion to an S corporation cannot be considered for valuation 
purposes.”151 Any gains attributable to altered tax status were not achievable for the 
company as operated and owned at the time of the merger, and arose solely by virtue of 
the accomplishment of the merger. Those gains were therefore properly excluded from 
“fair value.” 
5. Gholl: Changing Both the Controller and the Manager 
On one possible reading, Gholl v. eMachines, which was discussed in Part IV.A.3, 
represents a category 2 case.152 In Gholl, the court used DCF analysis to award the 
petitioners an amount greater than the sale price of the company. The court determined 
“fair value” exclusively by reference to a DCF analysis; it did not attempt to construct a 
hypothetical third-party sale value. In that case, the winning bidder for the company was 
a founder and director, although not a controlling shareholder, but was assumed to have 
had the kind of informational superiority associated with a controlling shareholder.153 
There was no indication that the bidder had any plans to operate the company differently 
following the merger. In fact, what the court took pains to do was to rely on the cash flow 
projections that best reflected merger date estimates of the company’s future performance 
under a business plan adopted by the board shortly before the merger auction took place. 
We commend the Gholl opinion because of its attention to performing a correct DCF 
analysis based on the pre-merger plans of the company, and because it did not attempt to 
address concerns about potential abuse by the founder-director-bidder through reliance on 
a hypothetical third-party sale value. 
In closing, we repeat our earlier contention that in these category 2 cases, paying the 
 149. Id. at 459. As discussed elsewhere, we are troubled by the ready acceptance of this form of “control 
premium” adjustment. As in Kleinwort, however, where the approach was first accepted, it appears to have been 
one that was advocated by both sides’ valuation experts. 
 150. Ng. v. Heng Sang Realty Corp., Civ. A. No. 18462, 2004 WL 1151980 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2004).
 151. Id. at *6. 
 152. Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 19444-NC, 2004 WL 2847865 (Del Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) 
(declining to find that the actual sale price necessarily exceeded or equaled “fair value”). 
 153. Id. at *15. 
[HAMERMESH & WACHTER] FINAL 5/10/2006  4:29:28 PM 
158 The Journal of Corporation Law [Fall 
 
minority shareholders the going concern value of the firm protects the interests of the 
minority shareholders. They are cashed out at the value of the shares had they been held 
indefinitely into the future. The characteristic feature of category 2 transactions is that 
whatever value enhancing changes are planned would not occur absent the merger. 
Whether it is the straightforward financial recapitalization, the reconsolidation of a failing 
subsidiary, or a change in management, the gains occur after the merger and would not 
occur without the merger. By adopting this resolution of category 2 cases, Delaware’s 
appraisal rule encourages value enhancing transactions by not taxing the controlling 
shareholder with the burden of paying for a share of transactions or future returns that are 
not forthcoming at the time of the merger. This approach, however, may not 
appropriately extend to other categories of cases, including the one to which we turn next. 
C. Category 3 Cases: Controlling Shareholder Squeeze-Out Merger/“Fair Value” 
Equals Going Concern Value Under Controlling Shareholder’s Post-Merger 
Management Plans 
Our third category of cases is the one to which the Delaware case law speaks the 
least clearly. At first glance, our suggestion that “fair value” should be determined by 
reference to corporate plans and assets that were not operationally in place within the 
enterprise before the merger seems to contradict the core precept that the dissenting 
shareholder is only entitled to the “value [of] what has been taken from the shareholder, 
i.e., the proportionate interest in the going concern.”154 If, as the cases hold, the 
corporation must be valued on the basis of “the operative reality on the date of the 
merger,”155 how, one might argue, can “fair value” be determined by reference to plans 
or assets not in place and operational at the time of the merger? Moreover, how can we 
assert that “fair value” may be determined by reference to plans or assets not in place at 
the time of the merger, when the Delaware Supreme Court has also pronounced that 
“where the corporation’s going forward business plan is to retain the same management, 
a dissenting shareholder seeking appraisal may not seek to attribute value to an 
alternative cost pattern which may occur post-merger.”156
In fact, we believe that both finance theory and Delaware case law are consistent 
with our view that minority shareholders have a right to “fair value” that incorporates not 
only current assets but also future reinvestment opportunities, so long as those 
reinvestment opportunities reflect pre-merger plans or policies of the corporation and its 
controlling shareholder. From the perspective of finance, as described in Part III.A.3, the 
going concern value of a corporation includes not only the cash flow from existing assets, 
but also from the return on reinvestment opportunities. These reinvestment opportunities 
will not have been taken at the time of the merger, because they are to be funded with 
future free cash flow. Consequently, the assets purchased as part of the reinvestment 
opportunities will not exist at the time of the merger. However, these assets are as much a 
part of the present value of the corporation as are the value of the existing assets. 
The consistency between our approach and Delaware case law draws upon three 
 154. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d at 289, 298 (Del. 1996); see also Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. 
Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950). 
 155. Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 298. 
 156. Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 363 (Del. 1997). 
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distinct lines of authority in Delaware appraisal law, each of which demonstrates that, in 
appropriate circumstances in which a controlling shareholder is acquiring the minority 
shares, the courts have interpreted “fair value” to include elements of value that arise 
from assets or plans that were not in place operationally at the time of the merger. Those 
three areas, as developed below, involve: (1) pro forma inclusion of assets not formally 
owned by the corporation at the time of the merger, but constructively attributed to the 
corporation because they had represented a corporate opportunity wrongfully usurped 
prior to the merger; (2) projections of post-merger returns in which actual costs are 
disregarded and excluded because they represent improper benefits to the controlling 
shareholder; and (3) operating improvements that the controlling shareholder implements 
following the merger but that do not depend causally upon the consummation of the 
merger. We review these three areas in order. 
1. Inclusion of Usurped Business Opportunities 
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett157 is the keystone, in fact, the sole component, in this 
category of authority. In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court was called upon to 
consider whether the “fair value” of the dissenters’ shares could include their 
proportionate share of the value of a line of business that, they had claimed, would have 
belonged to the corporation at the merger date but for the controlling shareholder’s 
wrongful usurpation of the opportunity to acquire the business. Rather than reject this 
claim on the ground that the line of business was not part of the corporation’s “operative 
reality” at the time of the merger, the court agreed that the value of that line of business 
could be taken into account in determining “fair value,” as if it had been formally part of 
the corporation’s assets.158 The court approved this approach, moreover, even though no 
derivative suit challenging the usurpation had been filed at the time of the merger.159
This result in Cavalier did not require doctrinal contortion. If a business opportunity 
is wrongfully usurped before the merger, the corporation would have a claim to recover 
or impose a constructive trust upon that opportunity, a claim that could have been 
brought directly by or derivatively in the right of the corporation.160 That sort of claim is 
nothing more or less than an intangible asset of the corporation, capable of contributing 
to merger date “fair value” in the same way as other corporate assets.161 There may be 
 157. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) 
 158. Id. at 1143. 
 159. Id. at 1143-44. The lower court had determined that the petitioner “did not have knowledge of the 
basis for the corporate opportunity claim prior to the institution of the appraisal proceeding.” 
 160. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154-55 (Del. 1996); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 
A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 161. See Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 55 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
[I]n certain circumstances an appraisal proceeding will require the court to value breach of 
fiduciary duty claims . . . because those claims are part of the going concern value of the 
corporation whose entity value is being determined. Put a bit differently, because those claims are 
assets of the corporation being valued, the court must place a value on those assets in coming to a 
fair value determination. 
Id. at 55-56. See also Bomarko v. Int’l Telecharge, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13052, 1994 WL 198726, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
May 16, 1994) (“[B]reach of fiduciary duty claims that do not arise from the merger are corporate assets that 
may be included in the determination of fair value.”); In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., Civ. A. No. 9001, 
1990 WL 67839 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990) (supporting the same principle); Porter v. Tex. Commerce 
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reasons to discount the value of that claim to account for uncertainties and costs of 
recovery,162 but the mere fact that the underlying line of business was not owned by the 
corporation as of the merger date is not in itself a legal basis for excluding it from the 
determination of “fair value.”163
2. Excluding Past or Projected Expenses 
Similarly, and despite the general rule against assessing “fair value” by reference to 
operating conditions not extant at the date of the merger, the Delaware courts have 
consistently shown a willingness to determine “fair value” on a pro forma basis that 
excludes the effects of controlling shareholder conduct considered to constitute a breach 
of fiduciary duty. Several examples make this clear. 
Over 30 years ago, the court of chancery ruled that in determining the value of a 
film company’s assets, a distribution fee payable to the corporation’s controlling 
shareholder under a contract in force at the merger date should have been reduced from 
the contract amount (30%) to a lower amount (12.5%), because the controlling 
shareholder had failed to establish that the actual distribution fee was fair to the 
corporation.164 The Delaware courts have continually embraced this sort of adjustment 
ever since. 
In Dobler, the vice chancellor approved and relied in part on a DCF valuation that 
had been adjusted to eliminate the effects of (1) management fees paid to the parent 
company for which no justifying evidence had been presented; (2) interest associated 
with an unexplained intercompany loan to the parent company; (3) an unsupported 
allocation of corporate overhead charges made by the parent company; and (4) rentals 
Bancshares, Inc., Civ. A. No. 9114, 1989 WL 120358, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 1989) (“If the company has 
substantial and valuable derivative claims, they, like any asset of the company, may be valued in an 
appraisal.”); Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 351 (Del. Ch. 1973) 
(adjusting asset value upward to offset excessive distribution fee charged by parent company). 
 162. See, e.g., ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 931-32 (Del. Ch. 1999) (citing Gonsalves v. 
Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., Civ. A. No. 8474, 1996 WL 483093, at n.1 (Del Ch. Aug. 22, 1996)); see also 
Bomarko, Inc. v. Int’l Telecharge, Inc., C.A. No. 13052, 1994 WL 198726, at *3 (“[T]he value of the claims, if 
any, will be established through expert testimony in much the same manner that evidence typically is presented 
as to the value of other corporate assets.”). 
 163. We would reject the claim that a derivative action asserting the usurpation must have been on file 
before the merger in order to take the business opportunity into account in determining “fair value.” As 
previously noted, Cavalier explicitly recited the fact that no such claims had been pending, yet the court 
included the value of the usurped line of business in determining “fair value.” Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1143-
44. It is true that in an analogous setting addressed in subsection 2 of this Part, the supreme court ruled in 
Gonsalves that “in the absence of a derivative claim attacking excessive compensation, the underlying issue of 
whether [executive compensation] costs may be adjusted may not be considered in an appraisal proceeding.” 
Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 363 (Del. 1997). We believe, however, that the 
formal pendency of derivative proceedings pre-merger should not be dispositive, and that the Gonsalves court’s 
reference to derivative claims is best understood as referring to viable derivative claims, regardless of whether 
they have been formally commenced. Of course, the absence of such proceedings pre-merger may well be 
probative of the lack of merit of such claims, absent some explanation (e.g., key facts were not disclosed to the 
shareholders before the merger, as was the case in Cavalier) for the fact that such proceedings had not been 
commenced. 
 164. duPont, 312 A.2d at 351 (“So far as this fee is concerned MCA had a fiduciary duty to Universal and, 
therefore, it has the burden of demonstrating that the fee was fair.”). 
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associated with a sale to a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent company, and 
leaseback, of cellular sites and towers that the court found was “an inappropriate exaction 
by [the parent company] due to its corporate control.”165
In ONTI, the chancellor used a DCF analysis in which fees payable to the 
corporation by an affiliate of the controlling shareholder were adjusted from 20%, the 
rate paid prior to the merger, to 40%, a rate that the court found was required by the 
governing contract.166 In addition, the chancellor considered a further adjustment of 
future returns to reduce anticipated management fees to an affiliate of the controlling 
shareholder. The court declined to accept that adjustment only because the defendants 
offered persuasive evidence of the reasonableness of the management fee.167
In re Radiology Associates, Inc. Litigation approved the use of a DCF analysis that 
adjusted projected salaries to the officers of the corporation by backing out an amount 
deemed to constitute a return on equity rather than compensation because the salaries are 
proportional to share ownership.168
Nothing in these authorities, however, dispenses with the requirement that to accept 
a post-merger reconfiguration of assets or expenses in determining “fair value,” the 
reconfiguration must be proven to be more than the product of speculation. Thus, for 
example, in Gonsalves, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a ruling excluding a claim 
that the controlling shareholder’s compensation as CEO was excessive, noting that there 
was no plan prior to the merger to adjust that compensation, and that “fair value” “do[es] 
not include the capitalized value of possible changes which may be made by new 
management.”169 Even under a broad reading of the supreme court’s language in 
Weinberger as discussed above, the benefits of an alternative method of operation that is 
neither proposed before the merger nor implemented thereafter should not be taken into 
account in determining “fair value” because they constitute “speculative elements of 
value” excluded by section 262(h). 
3. Including Combinatorial Merger Gains Not Dependent Upon the 
Consummation of the Merger 
In contrast, there are at least two relatively recent instances in which the Delaware 
Court of Chancery, in assessing “fair value,” has included benefits arising from planned 
post-merger operating changes planned by the controlling shareholder before the merger. 
The first such instance is the decision in ONTI.170 In that case, the controlling 
shareholder (Colkitt) completed the challenged cash-out mergers on August 30, 1995.171 
Within a week, Colkitt announced one in a series of mergers that resulted in the merged 
 165. Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Civ. A. No. 19211, 2004 WL 2271592, at *7, 16-17 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2004). 
 166. ONTI, 751 A.2d at 917-18. 
 167. Id. at 918-19. 
 168. In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490-91 (Del. 1991). 
 169. Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 362-63 (Del. 1997) (emphasis added); see 
also Hodas v. Spectrum Tech., Inc., Civ. A. No. 11265, 1992 WL 364682, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1992) 
(finding no record support for the claim that the controlling shareholder’s compensation as an officer of the 
corporation was excessive and declining to adjust that compensation for valuation purposes). 
 170. ONTI, 751 A.2d at 904. 
 171. Id. at 907. 
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companies being combined with a publicly traded company named EquiVision (renamed 
EquiMed in the merger).172 The dissenters argued that the merged companies’ “fair 
value” should be determined by reference to their proportional contribution to the public 
company’s stock price. The chancellor agreed, rejecting the controlling shareholder’s 
argument that doing so would impermissibly incorporate elements of value arising from 
the accomplishment of the mergers. 
The court’s reasoning in ONTI drew upon Professor Coffee’s article and upon the 
“cornfield” hypothetical discussed earlier.173 In its ruling, the chancellor emphasized that 
Colkitt maintained throughout the power to combine the merged companies with 
EquiVision.174 And although the court did not make this point in so many words, the 
opportunity for that combination arose because of Colkitt’s controlling position with the 
merging companies.175 In any event, the bottom line reached in ONTI was the inclusion 
of a valuation that was dependent upon a market share price reflecting the benefits of the 
post-cashout merger combinations with the related businesses. Even so, after boldly 
applying the cornfield metaphor, the chancellor pulled back, attributing only a one-third 
weight to the value that gave effect to the post-merger combination (the “market-based” 
approach), and applied a two-thirds weight to the much lower DCF analysis (the 
“earnings-based” approach) done in the standard manner—namely, in a way that 
neglected the soon to be realized value of the post-merger combination. 
We believe that an application of our approach would have resolved this anomalous 
and unsatisfactory conclusion. The source of the anomaly was the court’s treatment of the 
standard DCF analysis, and particularly the treatment of the terminal value. The 
controlling shareholder’s expert applied a growth rate in determining the terminal value 
that was based on the existing companies’ historical non-merger growth rate. The 
dissenters’ expert advocated that the terminal value be based on capitalizing the existing 
firm’s earnings using a stock market multiple with the multiple based on that of 
comparable companies. The court rejected the analysis, concluding on the facts presented 
 172. Id. at 908. 
 173. In particular, the chancellor recited a point presciently made by Wilmington practitioner David 
McBride, who offered the following illustration: 
Let’s suppose that you are the minority owner in the company that owns the cornfield and the 
majority stockholder and the members of the board say to themselves, boy, we really are 
underutilizing this asset. We ought not utilize this as a cornfield. The company is only selling at 
about $1 per share. We can buy it at approximately that price and subdivide it or develop it and 
build buildings on it and sell those buildings or rent those buildings. 
And the majority stockholder says to himself, yes, that’s a great idea. Let’s freeze out the 
minority. I’m going to capture all of that value for myself. And there’s a freeze-out at a price that 
values the company by the majority stockholder at a price that reflects nothing but the value of 
that property as a cornfield. 
I would suggest to you that a valuation of that company as of the date of the merger that doesn’t 
take into consideration the nonspeculative possibilities of developing this cornfield into something 
other than a cornfield is not a realistic valuation of the company. The minority shareholders, under 
those circumstances, are entitled to a valuation that reflects the value of a company that owns a 
cornfield that can be developed into a major office center. 
Id. at 910 (quoting Symposium, supra note 105, at 638). 
 174. Id. 
 175. ONTI, 751 A.2d at 910. 
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that the companies were not comparable. 
In our framework, once the court accepted the cornfield metaphor, viewing the case 
as falling in our category 3, any coherent DCF calculation would need to include a 
terminal value based on the future growth prospects and capitalization rates of the post-
merger combination. Performed in this manner, the earnings-based approach would have 
provided a similar answer to that found in the market-based approach that was 
consciously based on the asset valuations in the post-merger combination. The courts’ 
typical preference for using several different methods to determine an appraisal price 
makes perfect sense when the differences represent alternative calculations based on a 
finding as to the configuration of the company being appraised. Each method then 
represents a check on the other and another point estimate that can be averaged. In this 
case, the court’s two methods, the earnings-based and market-based approaches gave 
radically different answers because they were based on conflicting theories as to the 
configuration of the company. As noted above, what was lacking was an earnings-based 
approach valuing the post-merger configuration of the company. 
More recently, the court in In re Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation176 determined fair value by reference to a business combination effected after 
the squeeze-out merger. In that case, the court considered whether a DCF valuation 
should incorporate post-merger savings anticipated to arise from the operational 
combination of the corporation and its controlling shareholder.177 The court’s 
determination to consider such anticipated savings in determining “fair value” rested on 
three points. 
First, the savings “were contemplated well before the going private merger.”178 
Thus, these savings, unlike the potential reduction of CEO compensation rejected in 
Gonsalves, were not speculative at the time of the merger. Second, the combinatorial 
benefits “could have been achieved without” accomplishment of the merger because the 
controlling shareholder “had the power to accomplish those savings without a business 
combination, such as by intercompany contractual arrangements.”179 Unlike the merger-
related benefits at issue in Allenson, the cost savings anticipated in Emerging 
Communications did not require that the merger be accomplished first.180
Finally, and in light of the two previous observations, the court concluded that “the 
value achieved by [the controlling shareholder’s] existing pre-merger ability to effect 
those cost savings was an asset of [the corporation] at the time of the Privatization 
merger. It therefore was a benefit in which all . . . stockholders, not just [the controlling 
shareholder], were entitled to share.”181
 176. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *13 (Del. 
Ch. May 3, 2004). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. In contrast, savings dependent upon going private, i.e., the elimination of costs of maintaining public 
company status, are dependent upon consummation of the merger, and should not be taken into account in 
determining “fair value.” In Emerging Communications the court acknowledged this point. Had there been 
proof that the projections it relied on contained “going private” savings, the court would apparently have been 
prepared to reduce the projected returns accordingly. The court, however, found no proof that such savings were 
built into the projections. Id. 
 181. Emerging Commc’ns, 2004 WL 1305745, at *13 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 
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D. Doctrinal Refinement of the Treatment of Merger-Related Gains In 
Assessing “Fair Value” 
In our view, the court’s treatment of the post-merger benefits in ONTI and Emerging 
Communications is extraordinarily insightful, and suggests a useful test for distinguishing 
between merger-related gains that should be excluded from “fair value” (the ordinary 
rule, we say) and those that should be included. In essence, what the courts in ONTI and 
Emerging Communications have done is articulate a standard grounded in the doctrine of 
corporate opportunity—the same doctrine that has permitted the courts, as in Cavalier, to 
include the value of operations that should, by reason of the doctrine, have been assets of 
the corporation at the time of the merger. 
While it has been articulated in a variety of different ways, the corporate opportunity 
doctrine as explicated by the Delaware courts to determine whether a corporate fiduciary 
may take a business opportunity for his own benefit includes a number of relevant 
considerations: (1) Is the corporation financially able to exploit the opportunity?; (2) Is 
the opportunity within the corporation’s line of business?; (3) Does the corporation have 
an interest or expectancy in the opportunity?; (4) Is the opportunity presented to the 
fiduciary in his individual and not his corporate capacity?; (5) Has the fiduciary 
employed the resources of the corporation in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity?182 
This doctrinal framework works reasonably well in explaining the court’s willingness in 
ONTI to give valuation effect to the post-merger business combinations affected by the 
controlling shareholder. The combinations with similar health care businesses were 
surely in the merged corporation’s line of business; the opportunity for the combinations 
arose (i.e., was presented to the controlling shareholder) through his position with the 
merged companies; and above all, the combinations, and the resulting combinatorial 
value they created, involved a use of the merged companies’ assets. Thus, the same sort 
of doctrinal considerations that lead to a finding of wrongful usurpation of a corporate 
opportunity point to the result reached in ONTI. 
Applying the corporate opportunity standards to the post-merger savings discussed 
in Emerging Communications similarly confirms, indeed, almost tracks, the court’s 
reasoning in that case. The post-merger gains fell plainly into the corporation’s “line of 
business,” since they arose directly from the combination of the corporation’s operations 
with those of the controlling shareholder. The benefits arose from use of the corporation’s 
assets, again, through their operational combination with the assets of the controlling 
shareholder. The opportunity arose because of the controlling shareholder’s position with 
the corporation. Specifically, it had been contemplated by the controlling shareholder 
even before the merger. Finally, the gains were ones that the corporation itself could have 
exploited even without consummating the merger. As a result, the court concluded that 
the cost savings should have been incorporated into future cash flow projections of the 
corporation at the time of the merger, just as if the corporate opportunity doctrine had 
been applied. 
Corporate opportunity principles, broadly defined to include the idea that use of the 
corporation’s own assets creates a proprietary interest on the part of the corporation in the 
289 (Del. 1996)). 
 182. See Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del. 1996) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 
509 (Del. 1939)). 
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resulting reinvestment opportunity, usefully define when post-merger enhancements 
should and should not be viewed as part of the nature of the enterprise for purposes of 
determining “fair value” in the case of a squeeze-out by a controlling shareholder. Gains 
that can only be created by the recapitalization or combination affected by the merger 
itself cannot and should not contribute to “fair value” for purposes of an appraisal 
proceeding. Moreover, where the corporation has a claim of entitlement to those gains 
under corporate opportunity standards, however, as where the gains arise in the line of the 
corporation’s business, or are attributable to the corporation’s assets as planned, or are in 
existence at the time of the merger, they are properly included within the enterprise, and 
the minority shareholders are entitled to a proportional share of such gains. This approach 
does not depend on a general phenomenon of asymmetric information, the point that 
Coffee relies upon to support the kind of result reached in ONTI,183 the extent and effect 
of which may be difficult to assess on the facts of any particular case. Our approach relies 
instead on circumstances that should be testable by evidence in actual cases, namely, 
whether the controlling shareholder has observably altered the conduct of the business of 
the corporation, and whether such an alteration can be said to have arisen from the pre-
merger character of the company’s business, or from the use of its assets. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Weinberger left us with a puzzle that gained prominence when Technicolor 
reiterated that the statutory exclusion of gains arising from the merger is a narrow one. 
This Article has offered a resolution of that puzzle. The resolution is consistent with the 
manner in which the courts have been dealing with the issue, but we believe it offers a 
principled method for differentiating between those gains that should be included in the 
going concern value and those that should not. We also offer specific suggestions on how 
to implement this approach in the context of a DCF analysis. 
The cornfield metaphor usefully illustrates and supports our approach. Specifically, 
if the controller is planning to develop the cornfield into an office complex, the gains 
from that investment must be included in the value of the target company, even if the 
controller has made no move to implement that development plan before the merger. The 
reason for this is straightforward and follows from the very meaning of going concern 
value and DCF analysis. In the DCF method, the value of the company appraised is both 
the discounted free cash flows of the current assets and the discounted free cash flows 
generated by the reinvestment opportunities. That is, the cash flows that the target 
company does not pay out as dividends are available for reinvestment. If the target 
company, prior to the merger giving rise to appraisal, planned to turn the cornfield into an 
office complex, then that investment is a reinvestment opportunity, which is included in 
the present value of the growth opportunities. 
We show that the corporate opportunity doctrine also provides a legal hook for 
resolving the valuation puzzle. The conversion of the cornfield into an office complex 
represents a corporate opportunity of the target company at the time of the merger. 
Although the corporate opportunity doctrine normally applies to the taking of an 
opportunity that has already occurred, the doctrine can easily be extended, without 
 183. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 407-12. 
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requiring doctrinal gymnastics, to a taking that is planned at the time of the merger, but 
has not yet occurred. 
In resolving the puzzle Weinberger poses, we can provide greater support for the 
court’s long standing insistence on the logic of using going concern value over third-
party sale value to measure fair value. The rationale for using third-party sale value is that 
going concern value does not provide sufficient protection against an opportunistic 
controller who would plan the minority shareholder squeeze-out to coincide with the 
discovery of a valuable reinvestment opportunity that it wants for itself. Our approach 
controls for potential opportunistic behavior by controllers. If planned prior to the 
merger, the reinvestment must be included in the value of the firm. The fact that the 
investment will not actually occur until after the merger is irrelevant. Indeed, none of the 
reinvestment opportunities, by their very definition, can already have been made as of the 
date on which the firm is to be valued. We believe that these reinvestment opportunities 
are at the heart of the opportunistic advantage that a faithless fiduciary could secure for 
itself. 
Our approach also provides guidance on other issues related to the third-party sale 
value conundrum. In our three-part categorization of cases, the first category includes 
cases where there is a third-party offer. Our recommendation, in keeping with current 
Delaware case law and finance theory, is that the courts should determine fair value by 
using third-party sale value minus the value of the synergies arising from the merger. In 
these cases, assuming the sale process is effective and truly independent, then the 
minority shareholder does essentially receive third-party sale value when she does not 
dissent and foregoes the appraisal of her shares. Although the court may have a difficult 
time determining the amount to discount the sale price to net out synergistic values, the 
lack of precision is not instrumentally important. Once the rule is in place, rational 
minority shareholders will accept the sale price and not challenge the merger unless they 
can make a case that the sale process was ineffective and offer an alternative and reliable 
DCF estimate that provides a higher value. 
Our second and third categories involve the squeeze-out of the minority 
shareholders by a controlling shareholder. In these cases there is likely no third-party 
offer. However, the minority shareholders are fully protected from opportunism, which is 
important in category 3 cases, because they can obtain their proportionate share of the 
value of any of the firm’s corporate reinvestment opportunities. Although this sharing of 
value related to reinvestment opportunities may not favor the minority shareholders as 
much as a third-party sale value standard, we believe that a reinvestment opportunity 
sharing rule does meet the real concerns of those who advocate third-party sale value. 
In all three categories, the court should apply going concern value that, as a remedy, 
protects the minority shareholders by making the merger Pareto-superior. Although the 
minority shareholders are not made better off, they are not made worse off either. They 
receive the value of what has been taken from them in appraisal. In the first category, 
where the sale process is effective, the minority shareholders should vote for the merger 
and receive the third-party sale value. In the second and third categories, an award of 
going concern value, which includes the reinvestment opportunities of the firm, fully 
protects the interests of the minority shareholders. 
 
